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Introduction 
There has been a long history in Christianity on the study of the relationship 
between theology and science. For example, the Greek Fathers "pursued scientific 
knowledge for its theological and moral use." 1 Even Augustine, who had an "ambivalent 
attitude toward science," used natural science to oppose astrology, grounding his argument 
"by reference to observable reality."2 In recent years, there have been efforts to relate 
theology and science in various ways.3 One of the on-going scientific discussions is the 
question of how something can arise and develop into something else in the universe. 
Among the theories that address this question is the scientific perspective of 'emergence', 
which was developed within an evolutionary understanding of the world. The scientific 
perspective of emergence is a framework to help one understand how matter is not only 
able to emerge but also develop into something essentially higher. One theologian whose 
theology developed within an evolutionary perspective was Karl Rahner, a prominent 
German Catholic Jesuit theologian (1904-1984 ). Rahner weaved evolutionary biology into 
his theology as a way to relate theology with the discoveries of science. In his work, Rahner 
explained how matter continues to develop even after the universe emerged. The 
development of matter in a state of 'becoming' is possible because of 'active self-
transcendence'. 
1 Peter M. J. Hess and Paul L. Allen, Catholicism and Science (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
2008), 8. 
2 Ibid., 9-11. 
3 For example, we see this effort from the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences (CTNS), 
which is a graduate program of the Graduate Theological Union {GTU) in Berkeley, California. See 
http: //www.ctns.org. The Catholic Church also engages theology and science, such as its work in the Vatican 
Observatory. See http://www. vaticanobservatory. va/content/specolavaticana/en.html. 
In this thesis, I will argue that the current scientific perspective of 'emergence' can 
give a more robust understanding to Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence.4 I will 
demonstrate this by showing that Rahner's concept of active self-transcendence is 
congruent to that of the of emergence. For example, both positions agree in the unity of all 
things and that there is a hierarchical level of complexity in the universe. In this respect, 
the scientific perspective of emergence strengthens and broadens Rahner's argument. 
Among the strengths of emergence, is that this framework can integrate patterns across 
levels of emergence and across a variety of scientific theories. 
This thesis will make its argument in three chapters. The first chapter will begin by 
exploring the main themes of Rahner's thought to better appreciate the context in which 
Rahner paints the development of matter to spirit before expounding on the notion of active 
self-transcendence. The goal of the first chapter will be to explain that active self-
transcendence speaks of 'matter' in a process of 'becoming' (and becoming something 
more), leaping to something essentially higher, and that this process of 'becoming' is made 
possible through the dynamism of the absolute being. By integrating the perspective of 
evolutionary biology, Rahner gives us a notion which paints a trajectory of development 
from the beginning of creation to the emergence of life. 
Emergence cannot be defined in simple terms. The second chapter will develop its 
argument in three parts: A, B, and C. Part A will begin by showing that emergence is often 
4 The notion of active self-transcendence can be found in many of Karl Rahner's writings. They 
include the following: Karl Rahner, "Christology Within an Evolutionary View of the World," in Theological 
Investigations, vol. 5, Later Writings, trans. by Karl-H. Kruger {London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1966); 
"Christology in the Setting of Modem Man's Understanding of Himself and of His World," in Theological 
Investigations, vol. 11, Confrontations, trans. by David Bourke {London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974 ); 
and Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity (New York: Crossroad, 
1984), 176-311. 
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identified with the concept of 'complexity'. Next, the perspective of emergence rose within 
the context of reductionism and understanding it will help shed a greater understanding on 
emergence. I will also discuss concepts such as epistemological (weak) and ontological 
(strong) emergence, including their meanings and characteristics. They are important to the 
discussion of this thesis. Part B will discuss how the perspective of emergence can show 
the development of human beings to something essentially higher from an evolutionary 
perspective. Using the characteristics of emergence, I will demonstrate how we can speak 
of the human person possessing a sense of openness today. Finally, in part C, I shall offer 
a working definition to the scientific perspective of emergence, including some 
clarifications. 
The last chapter of this thesis will synthesize Rahner's core ideas about the notion 
of active self-transcendence with the concepts, meanings, and characteristics of emergence 
as was described in the second chapter. The goal is to show how the concepts, meanings, 
and characteristics of emergence can strengthen Rahner' s argument on how matter can 
actively self-transcend to something essentially higher. Finally, I will also consider how 
the discussion in this thesis can be relevant for the understanding of Christian faith today 
and our place in the world. By the end of this thesis, I hope to have sufficiently 
demonstrated how the scientific perspective of emergence adds robustness to Rahner's 
notion of active self-transcendence, thereby making a positive contribution to the current 
efforts of elucidating the relationship between theology and science. 
This thesis also falls within a wider context, which is on the relationship between 
theology and science. As such, some consideration of the relationship between the two 
discipline before we delve into the thesis might be helpful. 
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1. Faith Intelligible with the Realities of Life 
Recently, a friend shared that a priest spoke about the soul. According to this priest, 
the soul remains on earth for forty days before ascending to heaven. When I inquired 
further, I learned that a lecturer had taught this at the seminary. I also remember a bishop 
who stated very confidently that evil spirits reside in temples, and this belief is also held 
by many Catholics in Asia. 
The example above 1s among the reasons why it is important to stress the 
relationship between theology and science. A simple fact is that science is important to life 
today. The practical application of science has shaped human life in ways that are profound, 
from mobile devices to medical advances. The discoveries of science make the universe 
comprehensible to us. Most of us do not think of science as a kind ofreligion; instead, it is 
a way for us to understand the nature of things through empirical means. Scientists develop 
theories to interpret the discoveries of science. For example, the discovery of radioactive 
waves as cosmic background noise is one of the data that enabled scientists to construct 
the Big Bang model, which tells us how the universe began. Scientific discoveries 
contribute to our progress as a species and to our species' understanding of itself. 
In their book The Grand Design, scientists Stephen Hawking and Leonard 
Mlodinow point out that people in the past turned to God because they did not know better. 
They assert that that is not the case today because science has made God irrelevant. They 
state that "ignorance of nature's ways led people in ancient times to invent gods to lord 
over every aspect of human life."5 This view echoes what Ian Barbour claims about certain 
5 Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design (New York: Bantam Books, 2012), 
25. 
4 
perspectives on religious beliefs. Barbour points out that people often have contrasting 
views of science and religion. Science is viewed as "objective, universal, rational, and 
based on solid observational evidence," while religion "seems to be subjective, parochial , 
emotional , and based on traditions or authorities that disagree with each other."6 Barbour 
also described four ways that science can relate to religion. They are Conflict, 
Independence, Dialogue, and Integration. 7 
One can hardly blame the bleak view that many people, such as Hawking and 
Mlodinow, have about religion. Religion is slow to enter into dialogue or seek some form 
of integration with other viewpoints. When it comes to religion, many seem to be in a place 
of conflict and independence. Our practice of religion can and must be better. Or else, 
Barbour' s bleak description of Christianity may prove to be correct. 
Working towards establishing a relationship between theology and science is a first 
step. Science is essential to our faith because the absence of a correct scientific perspective 
can leave a gap in our theology. This gap can result in a faith that is at risk of becoming 
parochial and out of touch with reality, or it can even give rise to superstition as we saw in 
the example at the beginning of this section. 
There has also been an ongoing discussion on the relationship between theology 
and science in the Catholic Church. Pope Francis himself integrated science into his 
6 Ian G. Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues, rev. ed (San Francisco: 
HarperSanFrancisco, 1997), 77. Barbour explains why this view is not valid in his book, but I will not delve 
into it in this thesis but just state that such a view of religion still exists today. 
7 Ibid. 
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encyclical Laudato Si'. In it, he speaks of "complex systems" and "biological evolution."8 
Francis's encyclical shows that science can ground the way in which we can understand 
ourselves and our place in the universe. Science can also give us a more "concrete language 
for our deepest insights about God's relation to creation."9 
St. Anselm tells us that theology is faith seeking understanding. Theology is a way 
for us to elaborate and make clear the contents of our faith. It makes sense, then, why 
Francis Schussler Fiorenza writes that "theology is a fragile discipline," which is "more a 
hope than a science." 10 Theology "is more like a raft bobbing on the waves of the sea than 
a pyramid built on solid ground. " 11 From my perspective, establishing a relationship 
between theology and science makes theology less like a raft bobbing on the waves of the 
sea. This relationship will allow one to speak of a divine action in a way that is grounded 
and real. Thomas Tracy tells us that "any divine action that affects historical events, 
therefore must take the form of an intervention that disrupts the intelligible structures of 
the world around us and threatens the coherence and integrity of our lives." 12 
Having considered how science can enrich our own understanding of faith, this 
thesis now will delve into the work of Rahner, whose theology is also enriched by the 
discoveries of science. 
8 Francis, Laudato Si': On the Care for Our Common Home, May 24, 2015, Chapter 1, #18 , accessed 
September 9, 2016, http: //w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-
francesco 20150524 enciclica-laudato-si.html. 
- -
9 Robert John Russell, Cosmology, from Alpha to Omega: The Creative Mutual Interaction of 
Theology and Science (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008), 52. 
1° Francis Schussler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin, Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic 
Perspectives, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2011), 3. 
II Ibid. 
12 Thomas F. Tracy, ed., The God Who Acts: Philosophical and Theological Explorations, 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 78. 
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Chapter 1 
The Notion of Active Self-Transcendence 
In this chapter, I will outline Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence. The 
heart of Rahner's argument is that matter increases in complexity through a process of 
becoming, leaping to something essentially higher. This is made possible by the dynamic 
creative power of the absolute being, which is immanently present in creation. Before 
delving into Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence, this thesis will consider Rahner's 
own disposition with science. Then, this thesis will discuss some of his pertinent 
theological themes. It is important to understand Rahner's anthropology because he speaks 
of the human person transcending into the mystery of God, which is made possible through 
active self-transcendence. The notion of active self-transcendence exposes Rahner's efforts 
in integrating an evolutionary perspective into an overarching metaphysics that describes 
how God acts in creation. The goal of this chapter will be to grasp the notion of active self-
transcendence. 
1. Karl Rabner and Science 
Rahner understood the need for the relationship between theology and science. He 
belonged to the Catholic G6rresgesellschaft for the Advancement of Science, which was 
established in 1957, five years before the opening of the Second Vatican Council. Rahner 
also took "an active part in the annual conferences (often in Feldafing in Bavaria), and 
there presented his view on questions of hominization, genetic engineering, and so on; 
7 
these were also published later." 13 Rahner saw science as a way to understand "how God's 
creative presence is working itself out in history." 14 He was described as a "pastoral 
theologian of the Church, very conscious of the particular context of German Catholicism 
in the early twentieth century." 15 He was said to see "himself as a theologian of a Church 
trying to locate itself and find a voice in the new world, especially a new Germany." 16 
In "Christo logy within an Evolutionary View of the World," Rahner writes that it 
is inevitable that a believer will wonder whether the understanding of "evolution of the 
world can be justified before the Christian faith." 17 In addition, Rahner thinks that a 
believer is bound to ask a second legitimate question about whether "his faith is compatible 
and at least sufficiently reconcilable with the lifestyle and the horizons of understanding 
which he shares with his age and with his contemporaries." 18 For Rahner, the human person 
is something special, and thus he sees that "the persistent problem theology has with 
evolutionary thinking is that the latter seems to diminish human uniqueness, resulting in 
the view that the human being is simply a highly complex animal." 19 
13 Herbert Vorgrimler, Understanding Karl Rahner: An Introduction to His Life and Thought (New 
York: Crossroad, 1986), 73. 
14 Michael Barnes, "Demythologization in the Theology of Karl Rabner," Theological Studies 55, 
no. I (1994): 28 . 
15 George E. Griener, "Karl Rabner: Pastoral Theologian," in Finding God in All Things: 
Celebrating Bernard Lonergan, John Courtney Murray, and Karl Rahner, ed. Mark Bosco and David 
Stagaman (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 151. 
16 Ibid., 151. 
17 Rabner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 178. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Gregory Brett, The Theological Notion of the Human Person: A Conversation Between the 
Theology of Karl Rahner and the Philosophy of John Macmurray (New York: Peter Lang, 2013) , 263. 
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In Foundations of Christian Faith , Rabner states that he wants to "give people 
confidence for the very content of Christian dogma itself that they can believe with 
intellectual honesty."20 Intellectual honesty "does not compel one to believe, but it does 
make it justifiable for one to do so."21 To be intellectually honest is to accept that one's 
faith is, "humanly speaking, always open and provisional , and capable of further 
development."22 It is in this sense that "faith itself. . . actively explores its own 
content.. .[and] activates the critical and speculative faculties of the believer, causing him 
to put the vital question of what his conscience demands of him in terms of truthfulness to 
himself."23 Quoting I Peter 3:15, Rabner tells us that we "want to reflect here upon this 
fact of our Christian existence, and we want to justify it before the demands of conscience 
and of truth by giving an 'account of our hope. ' "24 
There are two ways to describe Rabner's work on the relationship between science 
and theology. First, he is "forging links of meaning," as described by Philip Hefuer, who 
explains, "If we engage science from a stance within religious experience, we will seek 
above all to forge links of meaning between the world that science describes and that which 
is most important to us." Hefner also states that "forging links that relate our lives to the 
world around us is equivalent to establishing meaningfulness between ourselves and the 
20 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 12. 
2 1 Karl Rahner, "Intellectual Honesty and the Christian Faith," in Theological Investigations, vol. 7, 
Further Theology of Spiritual Life I , trans. David Bourke (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1971), 71 . 
22 Ibid., 57. 
23 Ibid. , 58. 
24 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 2. 
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world."25 Hefner tell us how meaning is established when speaking about forging meaning 
and the process of discernment. He says that "meaning is established, for example, if a 
person can take into account one or more natural processes - say, the evolution of life on 
planet Earth or big bang cosmology - and come to the conclusion either that those 
processes are supportive of her or his deepest values or that they are hostile to those 
values."26 The similarity in position is on the "methodological point of departure" when 
engaging questions of evolution and theology, where Rahner states that "we are going to 
try to forge a link between theology and the basic concepts of an evolutionary 'world view,' 
as daring as this may sound."27 
The second description relates to Rahner's view of intellectual honesty and 
truthfulness. Michael Welker sees that the people who engage in discourses on science and 
theology can be seen as "truth-seeking communities," and in this way, they fight against 
"bad reductionism."28 Truth-seeking communities are groups of courageous people "who 
indeed raise truth claims, but above all develop and practice open and public forms and 
procedures in which these truth claims are subjected to critical and self-critical 
examination. "29 
25 Philip Hefner, "Religion and Science," in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. 
Philip Clayton and Zachary R. Simpson (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 563 . 
26 Ibid. 
27 Karl Rahner, "Natural Science and Reasonable Faith," in Theological Investigations, vol. 21, 
Science and Christian Faith, trans. Hugh M. Riley (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1988), 34. 
28 Michael Welker, "Science and Theology: Their Relation at the Beginning of the Third 
Millennium," in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton and Zachary R. Simpson 
(Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 551-561. 
29 Ibid., 557. 
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Herbert Vorgrimler states that in his dialogue with natural scientists, Rabner 
learned "from them to think m a rationally limited way in evolutionary terms."30 
Vorgrimler goes on to say, 
He learned to understand the history of God with the world and humanity as an 
evolutionary process which moves forward in qualitative 'leaps': from the 
inorganic to life, from the vegetative to consciousness, from the animal kingdom to 
the human world, from parents to the child, from humanity to God in man, in Jesus 
of Nazareth, from death to consummation. He termed these 'leaps' or transitions 
self-transcendence, and in so doing preserved the honour of humanity, including 
the honour of natural sciences, and the honour of God: God alone can enable the 
finite to bring forth something really new. 31 
2. Transcendence and the Self-Communication of God 
The human person is wrapped in the absolutely incomprehensible mystery whom 
we call God. Harvey D. Egan writes that "theology, for Rabner, must always be salvific, 
that is, focused on God's forgiving, healing, and transforming love as revealed in the long 
history of salvation which reached its high point in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ."32 Hence, Rabner views Christianity as simply "nothing more than the genuine 
explication and true interpretation of what resides in the ultimate depth of the human 
person."33 In essence, "because Christianity is the best interpretation of what and who we 
are, Rabner grounded his theology in God's unending self-revelation in human experience 
manifested in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ."34 Thus, for Rabner, the 
30 Vorgrimler, Understanding Karl Rahner, 111. 
31 Ibid., 112. 
32 Harvey D. Egan, "Theology and Spirituality," in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner, ed. 
Declan Marmion and Mary E. Hines (2005; repr. , New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 14. 
33 Ibid. 
34 lbid. 
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ground of the finiteness that human beings experience is the very ground by which they 
transcend. Karen Kilby writes that when reading Rahner, "one is sure to come across the 
term transcendental, and in many disguises."35 She states that "Rahner is described as a 
transcendental Thomist and as a proponent of transcendental theology."36 Rahner speaks 
of "transcendental experience, transcendental revelation, human transcendence or 
transcendentality, of transcendental investigations, and of transcendental anthropology."37 
In Rahner's thought, "to transcend means to surpass, to go beyond or above, and one might 
expect 'transcendental' to have something to do with that which goes beyond or rises above 
something. "38 
Rahner's starting point is to see the human person as a question: "We must reflect 
first of all upon man as the universal question which he is for himself."39 When the human 
person faces themselves as a question, then that "creates the condition of really hearing, 
and the only answer brings the question to its reflective self-presence."40 In Spirit in the 
World, Rahner writes, "Man questions. This is something final and irreducible ... Man 
questions necessarily ... this necessity can only be grounded in the fact that being is 
accessible to man at all only as something questionable [Fragbarkeit], that he himself is 
insofar as he asks about being, that he himself exists as a question about being."41 
35 Karen Kilby, Karl Rahner: Theology and Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2004), 32. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Rabner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 11. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Karl Rabner, Spirit in the World, trans. William Dych (New York: Continuum, 1994), 57. 
12 
For the human person, to question is as essential as breathing. However, questioning does 
not bring the person outside of himself or herself but, rather, within. Rahner writes, "The 
question about being as a transcendental question consciously turns upon itself, looks and 
questions itself, it reveals itself as a knowledge of man about his questioning essence: he is 
already with being in its totality (beim Sein im ganzen): otherwise, how could he ask about 
it?'"'2 Gregory Brett points out that the human person is able to recognize a broader context 
within which the question has been asked and is open to "more" reality. 43 It is in the "act 
of knowing any particular thing, the human being is already 'beyond' this immediate object 
and has an awareness of the whole range of possible objects, or being as such. "44 Rahner 
writes, 
In his first question (which always takes place with the question of being as its 
ground) he is already quodamodo omnia (in a certain way everything), and still he 
is not yet that, he is still nothing, 'tabula rasa, materia prima in ordine intellectus' 
(a clean slate, prime matter in order of intellect), for precisely what he does is ask 
what he means when he asks about being in its totality.45 
A person, "insofar as he experiences himself as conditioned and limited by sense 
experience, and all too much conditioned and limited, he has already transcended this sense 
experience."46 The transcendence of the human person is "always orientated towards the 
holy mystery."47 It is by this that the questioning human person experiences his or her 
finiteness and "reaches beyond this finiteness and experiences himself a transcendent 
42 Rahner, Spirit in the World, 60 
43 Brett, Theological Notion Human Person, 52. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Rahner, Spirit in the World, 60 
46 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 20. 
47 Ibid., 21. 
13 
being, as spirit," as a "being with an t11;finite horizon."48 Rahner writes that "the infinite 
horizon of human questioning is experienced as a horizon which recedes further and further 
the more answers man can discover."49 This transcendental experience, the being "whom 
we call 'God' encounters man in silence, encounters him as the absolute and the 
incomprehensible."50 Egan explains that it is the call of mystery that "explains why our 
questions never cease, why we eventually must ask ultimate questions, and why we are 
never satisfied totally with anything in this life."51 For Rahner, mystery is "the horizon 
which cannot be mastered and which masters all of our understanding, and which allows 
the other to be understood by being present to itself in its silence and in its 
incomprehensibility."52 This relates to Rahner's view on the transcendental nature of 
human beings, which is very much at the heart of his theology. Rahner states, "Man [as a 
being is] mystery in his essence, his nature... beings who are referred to the 
incomprehensible God. But this reference, which is our nature, can only be conceived and 
understood when we allow ourselves freely to be grasped by the incomprehensible."53 
Thus, Rahner believes that "our whole existence is the acceptance or rejection of the 
mystery which we are, as we find our poverty referred to the mystery of the fullness."54 In 
this respect, mystery is not something to be discovered so that it ceases to be a mystery. 
48 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 32. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Egan, "Theology and Spirituality," 19. 
52 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 217 . 
53 Karl Rahner, "On the Theology of the Incarnation." in Theological Investigations, vol. 4, More 
Recent Writings , trans. Kevin Smyth (London: Darton, Longman, 1966), 108. 
54 Ibid., 109. 
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Instead, "mystery is our nature, because the transcendence which we are and which we 
accomplish brings our existence and God's existence together: and both as mystery."55 
A significant point for Rabner in his anthropology is his use of the transcendental 
pre-apprehension ( Vorgrif.f) of being. On this, Rabner states that "man is a transcendent 
being insofar as all of his knowledge and all of his conscious activity is grounded in a pre-
apprehension of 'being' as such, in an unthematic but ever-present knowledge of the 
infinity ofreality."56 Kilby explains the concept of Vorgrifjby explaining the sources from 
which Rabner drew: 
To characterize the Vorgrif.f, and its relation to our knowledge or choice of 
particulars, Rabner relies on a number of images. One is taken from Heidegger: we 
are aware of infinite being as the horizon for our knowledge of finite things. An 
awareness of being and of God, to put it another way, forms the ever-present and 
necessary background for our knowledge of the particular objects that lie in the 
foreground of consciousness. A second image is borrowed from (though not 
original to) Aquinas: the Vorgriff is the light which in illuminating the individual 
objects allows our intellect to grasp them. A third image, that of movement, Rabner 
owes chiefly to Marechal: we have a dynamism towards being and God, so that the 
mind always moves beyond any particular, never entirely satisfied or at rest.57 
The expression 'mind always moves beyond any particular' can be understood in 
the sense that we transcend ourselves even in our thinking. This speaks to Rabner's point 
about the human person as a transcendent being. Kilby notes, "Rabner is always careful to 
insist, not to confuse the kind of awareness we have of being and of God with our 
knowledge of finite objects."58 At least the first two of the three images that characterize 
55 Rahner, "Theology of the Incarnation." 109. 
56 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 33. 
57 Kilby, Karl Rahner, 20. 
58 Ibid. 
15 
Rahner' s use of Vorgriff can help us make the distinction between the two kinds of 
knowing. 
Rahner says that in order "to determine the breadth of the horizon" that we want to 
pre-apprehend, the question to ask is this: "Is this horizon that of the imagination of infinite 
space and time, or is it broader, in principle unlimited in every dimension, the horizon of 
being absolutely, which discloses itself as transcending space and time?"59 The nature of 
this pre-apprehension is not in the "object of human knowledge," because it would mean 
that our pre-apprehension would be "conditioned by another pre-apprehension."60 Rahner 
tells us that "this 'wither' (Worauj) of the pre-apprehension as such is not a humanly 
conceivable object."61 Pre-apprehension is a way that we understand human knowledge 
but "pre-apprehension goes beyond what is 'grasped. '"62 Pre-apprehension is, then, not just 
about what can be grasped or about the attainment of human knowledge, but rather it is the 
act of pre-apprehending itself that moves us "towards the totality of the object. "63 
Another aspect that is important to consider before delving into Rahner's 
evolutionary view is his understanding of the self-communication of God. God's self-
communication is not merely God speaking in a language that the human person can 
understand. In God's self-communication, what is "communicated is really God in his own 
being, and in this way it is a communication for the sake of knowing and possessing God 
59 Rabner, Spirit in the World, 143 . 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., 143-144. 
63 Ibid. , 145. 
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in immediate vision and love."64 In other words, "the giver is the gift given."65 Rahner 
writes that God's self-communication "has 'divinizing' effects in the finite existent in 
whom this self-communication takes place."66 Stephen J. Duffy further explains that, for 
Rahner, grace "is first and foremost God in self-communication."67 Grace is something 
accessible to everyone, and it is the heart of one's existence. Grace is not elusive as grace 
is present in one's relationship with God. If grace is the self-communication of God, then 
this self-communication is addressed to all creation. In his Theological Investigations essay 
"Theology and Anthropology," Rahner explains grace from a transcendental 
anthropological framework: 
Grace is God himself in self-communication, grace is not a 'thing' but - as 
communicated grace - a conditioning of the spiritual and intellectual subject as 
such to a direct relationship with God . . . it can only be understood from the point 
of view of the subject, with his transcendental nature, experienced as a being-in-
reference-to the reality of absolute truth and free-ranging, infinite, absolutely valid 
love. It can only be understood in one's innermost regions as an immediacy before 
the absolute mystery of God, i.e. as the absolute realization of man's transcendental 
nature itself, made possible by God in his self-communication.68 
Duffy writes that "grace is neither detraction from, nor alien addition to, the 
authentically human, but fulfillment of the openness to the mystery energizing the heart's 
drive to self-realization. Grace is ground, polestar, and goal of the human joumey."69 
Therefore, all truly human activity is a free, positive or negative, response to God ' s offer 
64 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 118. 
65 Stephen J. Duffy, "Experience of Grace," in Marmion and Hines, 44. 
66 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 120. 
67 Duffy, "Experience of Grace," 44. 
68 Karl Rahner, "Theology and Anthropology," in Theological Investigations , vol. 9, Writings of 
1965-67 1, trans. Graham Harrison (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972), 36-37. 
69 Duffy, "Experience of Grace," 45 . 
17 
of self-the grace at the heart of human existence. Because God offers nothing less than 
God's very own self to everyone, the human person is, to Rahner's way of thinking, homo 
mysticus, mystical person. 70 
3. An Evolutionary View 
At the beginning of the long chapter on Jesus Christ in Foundations, Rahner states 
that we have now arrived at what is "decisively Christian in Christianity."71 William Dych 
highlights the fact that Rahner' s evolutionary theory is within the context of asking, "how 
can the classical 'descending' Christology of God becoming incarnate in the world and in 
humanity be supplemented by an 'ascending' Christology which begins with the world and 
humanity, and sees them as moving towards this point of unity with God?"72 He traces 
three main steps on how Rahner shows this affinity and thereby an "ascending Christology 
of the world's movement towards unity with God."73 
First, there is the intrinsic unity of matter and spirit in the sense of the evolutionary 
movement of the material world towards spiritual existence. Secondly, there is the 
intrinsic unity between human spiritual existence and the life of grace freely 
bestowed by God. Thirdly, there is the intrinsic unity between the union of human 
beings with God in grace and the hypostatic union of the man Jesus with God.74 
Dych observes that "in Rahner's cosmic vision the being of the whole created universe 
moves towards its fulfillment in human being, and human being moves towards its 
70 Harvey D. Egan, "The Mystical Theology of Karl Rahner," The Way 52, no. 2 (April 2013): 43. 
71 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 176. 
72 William Dych, Karl Rahner (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1992), 69. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 69-70. 
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fulfillment in Jesus Christ."75 Thus, Rabner's cosmology, anthropology, and Christology 
are "intrinsically related moments within this single vision."76 
The intrinsic unity of spirit and matter is an important point for Rabner. This also 
clarifies that his thoughts on spirit and matter are far from a Cartesian body-soul dualism. 
Cartesian dualism was a result of Rene Descartes grappling with "the thinking activity of 
the knower" yet being embodied in the material world. 77 This required some disengagement 
on the part of the thinking knower from the usual bodily perspective. Descartes, who was 
mostly a physicalist, believed that "all basic bodily functions were aspects of a physical 
'machine,' and that the functioning of animals did not transcend these mechanisms. "78 
Believing the body to be a physical machine and unable to imagine "how rationality could 
be manifest by a machine," Descartes sharpened the distinction between body and soul. 79 
Brett notes that Rabner "sets out to avoid the anthropological dualism present in the 
traditional distinction between body and soul."80 
4. Active Self-Transcendence 
The key phrases relevant to the notion of active self-transcendence, which Rabner 
uses in Foundations, are "becoming" (as in "becoming something more"), "surpassing of 
75 Dych, Karl Rahner, 70. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), 145. For more, read the Cartesian Mind-Body/ Body-Soul treatment, which Taylor 
presents in 143-158. 
78 Warren S. Brown, "The Emergence of Human Distinctiveness," in The Depth of the Human 
Person: A Multidisciplinary Approach, ed. Michael Welker (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2014), 
110. 
79 Ibid., 122. 
80 Brett, Notion of Human Person, 263 . 
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self," "intrinsic increase of its own being," and "emptiness actively achieving its own 
fullness."81 The power of the absolute fullness of being is so intrinsic to the finite existent 
that this finite existent is empowered to achieve a real and active self-transcendence. 82 
Thus, the notion of self-transcendence "includes transcendence into something 
substantially new, a leap to something essentially higher. "83 Rahner tells us that 'matter' in 
creation has evolved towards 'spirit' in a process of active self-transcendence made 
possible by the power of the absolute being. In this respect, the process of active self-
transcendence is related to the emergence of matter in creation, and from matter, life 
emerges. 
The notion of active self-transcendence expresses Rahner's own concern as to how 
one can understand the salvific destiny of the human person. However, active self-
transcendence is broader and more inclusive than just the human person, for the notion 
includes the emergence of everything, including the entire evolutionary process. It is key 
that one sees active self-transcendence as the development of matter in the direction of the 
spirit under the dynamism of the absolute being. 84 This development from within towards 
what is essentially higher, conceived as a being's "self-transcendence," can be thought of 
as "evolution."85 
81 Rabner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 184. These concepts are similar to his essay, 
"Christology Within Evolutionary View," 165-166. 
82 Ibid., 185. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 6, The Unity of Spirit and Matter in the Christian 
Understanding of Faith, trans. Karl-Heinz Weger, 153-177 (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1969), 
178. 
85 Karl Rahner, "Evolution," in Sacramentum Mundi, ed. Karl Rahner (Herder & Herder: New York, 
1968), 290. 
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The concept of active self-transcendence is also important to the way human 
persons can understand themselves today. Rahner tells us that "an essential trait in modem 
man's understanding of himself and of his world is the conviction that the world is not a 
static reality, but rather a world in process of becoming, subject to the process of evolution 
and history."86 In his own modest way, Rahner integrated the evolutionary understanding 
of science to present a trajectory of how one can perceive the development of the universe 
since the beginning of time. This evolutionary perspective is the notion of active self-
transcendence. The key concepts remain the same throughout his writings. In this respect, 
Rahner's thought in the notion of active self-transcendence has been rather consistent in 
his writings.87 
We must recognize the possibility of a genuine development from below into 
something higher, denying neither that this 'something higher' is genuinely new in 
time, nor that it has connections with what already exists in time. And if we do this 
then in the very nature of the case we cannot escape from the concept of becoming 
as a genuine process of self-transcendence. All creaturely being is being in process 
of becoming, but all becoming, if it is really worthy of the name, is the becoming 
of that which is qualitatively higher, and which, nevertheless, is the act of that 
which is lower. And it is precisely this that is signified when we speak of self-
transcendence. That which is higher is not merely added on to the lower stages in 
the world's development, but is actually enacted and attained to through these lower 
stages in a process of genuine self-transcendence. What was formerly signified by 
the terms 'conservatio' and 'concursus' in Christian theology is nothing else than 
the dynamic impulse towards precisely this self-transcendence present in all being 
in virtue of the immanence of God. 88 
In summary, active self-transcendence can be understood as follows: (I) there is a genuine 
development from something lower to higher, and all creaturely being is in the process of 
86 Rabner, "Christology in the Setting," 221 . 
87 Besides the notion of active self-transcendent being present in many of his TI writings, the core 
ideas are also present in his earlier work Hominisation . Rabner conveys this idea much more clearly in his 
later writings "Christology in the Setting" and in Foundations of Christian Faith . 
88 Rabner, "Christology in the Setting," 224-225 . 
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becoming; (2) true becoming must be conceived as "becoming more," a real surpassing of 
self or a leap to a higher nature; and (3) becoming takes place by the dynamism of the 
power of the absolute being.89 Points (1) and (2) will be important to our discussion on 
emergence later. Point (3) is the place where this thesis will contribute to the discussion of 
emergence, although, admittedly, the scientific community will not consider the dynamism 
of the power of the absolute being as the cause and reason for matter actively self-
transcending. 
What does it mean to say that the process of becoming takes place through the 
dynamism of the power of the absolute being? First, it speaks to the 'immanence' of God. 
God has always been immanently present within creation. This immanent presence of God 
is understood as a "fundamental relationship, which God bears on the world."90 This 
relationship is not "merely that of the Creator in the creature" but rather the "indwelling of 
God in the spiritual creature through grace."9 1 Rabner states that the "immanence of God 
in the world must be conceived of as of so radical a kind that the process of self-
transcendence inherent in being in process of becoming genuinely is and remains an active 
process of self-transcendence."92 Rabner holds that the "transcendence of God must be 
maintained ... by reason of God's sovereign independence of the world ... [to] ensure that 
what emerges from this process of becoming is that which is genuinely new."93 For Rabner, 
89 Points derived from Tl essays "Christology in the Setting" and "Christology Within Evolutionary 
View." 
90 Denis Edwards, How God Acts: Creation, Redemption, and Special Divine Action (Minneapolis, 
MN: Fortress Press, 2010), 39. 
9 1 Ibid. 
92 Rahner, "Christology in the Setting," 225 . 
93 Ibid. 
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that which is "new" represents a mode of being that was not previously there before, though 
he states that "even the very highest, although it is essentially new, can be understood as a 
variation of what existed previously. "94 The notion of active self-transcendence shows that 
"the state of becoming genuinely inherent in the world of itself postulates the fact that God 
is simultaneously immanent and transcendent in it in a single act."95 
By showing that the self-transcendence of creation "takes place within the 
dynamism of the power of absolute being," Rahner takes pains to note that God does not 
intervene with the processes of the universe and the world. 96 This issue is also pertinent to 
the current discussion about God's non-divine intervention in the world.97 The framework 
of active self-transcendence is Rahner' s way of seeing "God's operation as an enduring, 
active support of cosmic reality ... elaborated in such a way that this divine operation itself 
is envisaged as actively enabling finite beings themselves by their own activity to transcend 
themselves. "98 
Rahner states that the process of active self-transcendence is what Christians 
understand by 'preservation' and 'cooperation' of the universe. This refers to the Christian 
94 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 187. 
95 Rahner, "Christology in the Setting," 225. 
96 Ibid. 
97 There is a great deal of dialogue about speaking of a non-interventionist perspective of divine 
action. For example, Robert John Russell presents the framework of NIODA, an acronym for "non-
interventionist objective divine action." Russell, Cosmology, from Alpha to Omega: The Creative Mutual 
Interaction of Theology and Science, Theology and the Sciences. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2008), 
110-143. In his book The God Who Acts, Thomas Tracy states, "Any divine action that affects historical 
events, therefore must take the form of an intervention that disrupts the intelligible structures of the world 
around us and threatens the coherence and integrity of our lives." Thomas F. Tracy, The God Who Acts: 
Philosophical and Theological Explorations (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press), 78 . 
98 Karl Rahner, Hominisation: The Evolutionary Origin of Man as a Theological Problem , trans. 
W.T. O'Hara (Freiburg: Herder and Herder, 1965), 68-69. 
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perspective of the doctrine of creation. The question is how God continues to act in the 
universe after the act of creation. The Vatican Council I document Dei Filius states, "By 
his providence God protects and governs all things, which he has made, 'reaching mightily 
from one end of the earth to the other, and ordering all things well'. For 'all are open and 
laid bare to his eyes ' , even those things which are yet to come into existence through the 
free action of creatures."99 Dei Filius presents a classical perspective that God created the 
universe out of nothing (creatio ex nihilo) and continues to hold it in being (creatio 
continua). Church Father Athanasius taught that God made creatio ex nihilo and that "the 
presence of the Word in nature is necessary, not only for its original Creation, but also for 
its permanence, or else, everything that 'is' , should be broken up again into nothingness." 100 
The perspective of God's conservatio (preservation) and concursus (cooperation) in 
Christianity can also be found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC), which tells 
us, "With creation, God does not abandon his creatures to themselves. He not only gives 
them being and existence, but also, and at every moment, upholds and sustains them in 
being, enables them to act and brings them to their final end." 101 The CCC also states that 
"God is the sovereign master of his plan. But to carry it out he also makes use of his 
creatures' cooperation." 102 Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence tells us how this 
can be, which is through the creative dynamism of the power of God that is intrinsic in all 
creation. 
99 Vatican Council I, Dei Filius I. 
10° Contra Gentes, 41. 
101 Catechism of the Catholic Church , no. 301. 
102 Ibid., 306. 
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Rahner also speak repeatedly about spirit and matter in his notion of active self-
transcendence. Thus, it is important to understand what he means by "spirit" and "matter." 
Throughout his writings, Rahner emphasizes the intrinsic unity of spirit and matter. In 
"Christo logy in the Setting of Modem Man's Understanding of Himself and of His World," 
Rahner writes that "the Christian professes in his Faith that all things - heaven and earth, 
the material and the spiritual world - are the creation of one and the same God" and that 
the variety and differences in creation can "be seen to form a unity in origin, self-realization 
and determination, in short: one world." 103 In another place, Rahner writes, "Spirit and 
matter have necessarily an intrinsic connection with one another, because both of them 
derive from the one infinite Spirit which is God as their Creator."104 Thus, we cannot think 
of spirit and matter as existing alongside each other. Rahner points out that, firstly, the 
unity of spirit and matter is seen most clearly in the human person. 105 Secondly, the history 
of the development of spirit and matter "can be thought of as an 'evolution,' i.e., as 
development from within towards what is essentially higher, provided 'becoming' (in the 
full sense of the word) is conceived as a being's 'self-transcendence."' 106 
Since according to Christian philosophy and theology every created being, because 
finite, is in a state of becoming and changing and is part of the unity of the world 
which is directed towards a single goal of full accomplishment, the concept of 
evolution can be employed to describe, in a general and comprehensive way, what 
characterizes all the reality, distinct from God, which lies within the horizon of our 
experience. 107 
103 Rahner, "Christology Within Evolutionary View," 162. 
104 Rahner, "Christology in the Setting," 219. 
105 Rahner, "Christology Within Evolutionary View," 162. 
106 Rahner, "Evolution," in Sacramentum Mundi, 290. 
107 Ibid., 289. 
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In Rahner's framework, creation is the "self-bestowal of God" who "communicates 
his own reality to the other." 108 Thus, "creation can and should be conceived of as an 
element in, and prior setting for, the self-bestowal of God, that act in which he does not 
create something different from himself and set it over against himself, but rather 
communicates his own reality to the other."109 Denis Edwards explains Rahner's thought 
in stating, "God chooses to give God's self in love to what is not divine, and so creation 
comes to be."110 It is in this sense that we can speak of God as being always immanently 
present within creation. It is through this foundation of God's creative self-bestowal that 
the world emerges, enveloped in the history of God, while achieving "an ever-higher 
degree of self-transcendence."111 
It is the spirit that makes sense of matter. Much of the science begins and ends with 
the study of matter. Rahner's work seems to indicate very strongly that matter expresses 
the spirit. He writes, "What is material, therefore, is for a Christian, theistic philosophy 
only conceivable at all precisely as a factor in relation to spirit and for the sake of (finite) 
spirit." 11 2 An important point on this is Rahner's use of the term gefrorener, which is 
German for 'frozen' to describe matter. Rahner refers to Thomistic philosophy that 
regarded matter or what is material as a kind of "limited" or "solidified" spirit. 11 3 Patrick 
108 Rabner, "Christology in the Setting," 226. 
109 Ibid. 
11 0 Edwards, How God Acts, 39. 
Ill Ibid. 
11 2 Rabner, Hominisation , 55. 
11 3 Ibid. In some places, the word "limited" or "solidified" is translated as "frozen," but Rabner's 
Theological Investigations essay uses the word "frozen," Unity of Spirit and Matter, 186, 170, and 177. They 
all convey the same idea of what matter is in relation to Spirit. 
26 
Burke explains that Rabner's "notion of matter as 'frozen spirit' and an evolutionary 
worldview can be reconciled only on the double precondition that matter exists only for 
and in view of spirit and that God, as the ground of all inner-worldly becoming, 1s 
immanent within the process precisely by being transcendent over it."114 
Matter is "materia prima" (prime matter) that has a negative character where "in 
itself and of itself connoting no real act and no positive reality, [ and] is precisely the same 
being and perfection which, independently of such limitation and apart from it, connotes 
spirit, immanence and cognition." 11 5 Rabner also mentions the intrinsic negativity of 
matter, by which he means that matter by itself cannot transcend or rise above itself. 11 6 For 
Rabner, "spirit, at least finite spirit, can never be thought of in such a way that in order to 
attain perfection it must move away from material reality, or that its perfection increases 
in proportion to its distance from matter." 11 7 Rather, "spirit must be thought of as seeking 
and finding itself through the perfection of what is material. " 11 8 Rabner' s thoughts on matter 
appear to be more developed and clearer in Theological Investigations than in 
Hominisation, where he states that "matter is, therefore, the openness and the bringing-
itself-to-appear of the personal spirit in the finite world and hence is from its very origin 
114 Patrick Burke, Reinterpreting Rahner: A Critical Study of His Major Themes (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2002), 257. 
11 5 Rabner, Hominisation , 56. 
11 6 Ibid., 57. 
11 7 Ibid. , 59. 
11 8 Jbid. 
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related to the spirit, is a moment in the spirit, and indeed a moment of the eternal Logos as 
he freely but in fact exists, and this for all etemity."119 
Earlier, Rabner said that the development of matter into something that is higher 
than itself is what Christian metaphysics and theology call God's immediate conservatio 
(preservation) and concursus ( cooperation). 120 Rabner understands creation to be the self-
bestowal of God and that God is the transcendent ground of everything. God is "present as 
the ground, implicitly and simultaneously affirmed, of every reality met with and affirmed, 
and as being, which is the ground of what is, but always present as mediated by finite 
things." 121 It is along these lines that Rabner saw that it is only by the divine operation of 
God, which is an enduring, active support of cosmic reality, that enables finite beings to 
transcend themselves. 122 
Edwards states that the core idea of Rabner's notion of self-transcendence is in 
God's immanent presence, which enables and empowers evolutionary emergence.123 The 
"fundamental effect of God's immanent presence" is that "creation has the capacity for 
self-transcendence."124 Rabner's "two concepts of divine self-bestowal and creaturely self-
transcendence are interrelated: it is God's self-bestowal that enables and empowers 
creaturely self-transcendence."125 Rabner "considers the transitions to the new in the history 
119 Rabner, Unity Spirit and Matter, 171 . 
120 Rabner, Hominisation , 65 . 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid., 69. 
123 Edwards, How God Acts, 43-45. 
124 Ibid., 43. 
125 Ibid. 
28 
of the umverse, particularly when matter becomes life, and when life becomes self-
conscious spirit." 126 In Rahner' s concept of active self-transcendence, "there is an 
evolutionary dynamism that is truly intrinsic to creation but occurs through the creative 
power of the immanent God."127 According to Edwards, "the idea of self-transcendence 
indicates that at the empirical level of science, the emergence of the new is completely 
open to explanation." 128 In a nutshell, "the material universe transcends itself in the 
emergence of life, and life transcends itself in the human. In human beings, the universe 
becomes open to self-consciousness and freedom, and to a fully personal response to God's 
self-bestowal in grace." 129 
5. The End-Goal of Active Self-Transcendence 
Having presented the notion of active self-transcendence, Rahner speaks of the 
finality of the history of nature and spirit. He states, 
If man is thus the self-transcendence of living matter, then the history of nature and 
of spirit form an intrinsic and stratified unity in which the history of nature develops 
towards man, continues on in him as his history, is preserved and surpasses in him, 
and therefore reaches its own goal with and in the history of man 's spirit. 130 
Rahner has painted a trajectory where "the whole movement of creation reaches its 
goal in the free and self-conscious human person," and in a certain sense, "the human 
person sums up creation." 131 Through the evolutionary process, the "history of nature 
126 Edwards, How God Acts, 43 . 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid., 44. 
130 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 187. 
131 Roman A. Siebenrock, "Christology," in Marmion and Hines, 119. 
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reaches its goal" in the human person, and now humanity must "continue its history." 132 
The human person, who is the product of creation, has achieved "self-presence in the 
cosmos," and "this self-presence of the cosmos in the spirit of individual persons has a 
history which is still going on," both individually and collectively. 133 When we consider 
the trajectory painted by Rahner by which the "cosmos becomes conscious of itself in man, 
in his individuality and in the freedom he actualizes, [then] this process must also have a 
final result." 134 Christian terminology usually expresses it as "man's final and definitive 
state, his salvation, the immortality of the soul or the resurrection of the flesh," all of which 
describes something of the "final and definitive state of fulfillment for the cosmos." 135 
Rahner also further elaborates on how we can understand the Christian teachings on grace 
and glory. The "immediate self-communication of God to spiritual creature takes place in 
what we call 'grace' while this self-communication is still in its historical process, and 
'glory' when it reaches fulfillment." 136 We can see now why Rahner considers the 
evolutionary process as a history of matter towards spirit. This spirit is the self-presence of 
creation in the cosmos, whose goal is the infinite and the ineffable mystery of God. He 
writes, 
The mystery which we call God gives himself in his divine existence, gives himself 
to us for our own in a genuine act of self-bestowal. He himself is the grace of our 
existence. We shall say, therefore, that what we mean by the creation is that the 
divine being freely 'exteriorises' his own activity so as to produce non-divine being, 
but does this solely in order to produce the necessary prior conditions for his own 
divine self-bestowal in that free and unmerited love that is identical with himself; 
132 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 187. 
133 Ibid., 190. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
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that he does this in order to raise up beings who can stand in a personal relationship 
to himself and so receive his message, and on whom he can bestow not only finite 
and created being distinct from himself, but himself as well. In this way he himself 
becomes both giver and gift, and even more the actual source of man's own capacity 
to receive him as gift. Thus the finite, of its very nature as finite, finds its ultimate 
fulfillment in God as the mysterious infinite. 137 
6. A Synthesis of Rahner's Notion 
Rahner's thoughts on active self-transcendence are consistent m many of his 
writings although his expression varies. My thoughts are that it would be helpful to 
synthesize Rahner's notion from his various writings. My working definition of active self-
transcendence is as follows: Active self-transcendence can be described as matter 
developing in a process of becoming whereby the higher levels are orientated in terms of 
an ever-increasing complexity with and through the lower levels of matter, giving rise to 
something substantially new, a leap into something essentially higher. This is made 
possible through the creative power of the absolute fullness of being that is so intrinsic to 
the finite existent that this finite existent is empowered to achieve a real and active self-
transcendence. 
There are two points within Rahner's notion which I will emphasize. First, Rahner 
uses the term 'higher' and 'lower' order to characterize a process of active self-
transcendence. He writes, "The higher order always embraces the lower as contained in it, 
it is clear that the lower always precedes the actual event of self-transcendence and prepares 
the way for it by the development of its own reality and order. " 138 He further argues that 
the lower not only prepares and that "which is higher is not merely added on to the lower 
137 Rahner, "Intellectual Honesty Christian Faith," 63-64. 
138 Rahner, "Christology Within Evolutionary View," 168. Rahner's thoughts here appear to be 
similar to his later writings in Foundations of Christian Faith, 186. 
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stages in the world's development, but is actually enacted and attained through these lower 
stages in a process of genuine self-transcendence."139 The higher (levels) develop in 
complexity with and through the lower (levels). 
Second, Rahner's use of active self-transcendence states that "the development of 
biologically organized materiality is orientated in terms of an ever-increasing 
complexity." 140 In his essay "Christology Within an Evolutionary View of the World," 
Rahner speaks of "transcendence into what is substantially new, i.e. the leap to a higher 
nature. " 141 Rahner' s thoughts appear to be similar and yet more inclusive by the time he 
wrote Foundations of Christian Faith , stating it as "transcendence into something 
substantially new, a leap to something essentially higher. " 142 I prefer the latter as I agree 
with Rahner that the development of matter within the process of active self-transcendence 
meant not only a growing complexity of matter into something substantially new but that 
it is a leap to something essentially higher. The notion of active self-transcendence is thus 
broadened and is inclusive of all creation. 
Rahner relates the concepts he used for active self-transcendence with evolution. 143 
Given what we know from the recent discoveries of science, emergence seems to be most 
apt as the concept itself applies to the whole of creation and that ever since matter emerged 
139 Rahner, "Christology Within Evolutionary View," 225. 
140 Rahner, "Christology in the Setting," 219. We see Rahner also using the phrase "growing 
complexity" in another place. Rahner, "Evolution," 291. 
141 Rahner, "Christology Within Evolutionary View," 166. 
142 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 185. 
143 See Rahner, "Evolution," 289-294. 
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at the beginning of the universe, it entered into a process of becoming, increasing in 
complexity from something lower to something essentially higher. 
7. Conclusion 
We have seen the main ideas of active self-transcendence and how it integrates an 
evolutionary view of the world. Rabner explained that everything was possible because of 
the dynamic creative presence of the absolute being we call God. One can get a feel of the 
characteristics that are important in Rabner's notion of active self-transcendence. For 
example, there is unity in all things, there is a sense of a trajectory, there is a becoming in 
matter where there is an increase of complexity, there is newness of something that had not 
previously existed, and there is a description of the higher and lower. 
The next chapter will present the scientific perspective of emergence, which 
resonates closely with the concepts, meanings, and characteristics of active self-
transcendence but is somewhat broader since it encompasses the scientific perspective. 
Chapter two will begin by discussing the views of scientists and theologians on the 
scientific perspective of emergence. Then, the chapter will dwell more deeply into core 
concepts, meanings, and characteristics of emergence. Finally, it will speak of the 
emergence of the conscious human person within an evolutionary perspective. Perhaps this 
accomplishes to a certain extent what Rabner sought to achieve: 
Naturally, it would in itself be desirable to show more concretely what common 
traits are to be found in the evolution of material, living and spiritual beings - to 
show (more exactly) how the merely material is a prelude in its own dimensions to 
the higher dimension of life, and how the latter in its dimension is a prelude to the 
spirit in its ever greater advance towards the border line to be crossed by self-
transcendence. 144 
144 Rahner, "Christology Within Evolutionary View," 168. 
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Chapter 2 
The Scientific Perspective of Emergence 
The goal of this chapter is to clarify and define the scientific perspective of 
emergence. This chapter will accomplish this in three parts: A, B, and C. 
The first part of this chapter will examine the concepts of emergence from 
theologians and scientists. For example, the work of theologians Philip Clayton and Niels 
Henrik Gregersen and of biologist Ursula Goodenough and neuroanthropologist Terrence 
Deacon are helpful in this regard. Clayton and Gregersen offer helpful concepts about how 
we can understand the scientific perspective of emergence. Meanwhile, Goodenough and 
Deacon offer a much more comprehensive and definite scientific theory of how things can 
emerge in the universe. 
The second part of this chapter will draw on the perspective of emergence to 
demonstrate that emergence can show us how the human person can emerge as a species 
possessing consciousness and a wide sense of horizon. This section will begin by exploring 
the work of psychologist, neuroanthropologist, and cognitive neuroscientist Merlin 
Donald. The heart of Donald's argument is that the human brain evolved with culture, 
resulting in the emergence of human persons with "hybrid-minds." Culture results in the 
symbolic capacity of the human person, and with it, the externalization of memory. 
Donald's argument shows that being able to store our memories in culture expands our 
operational mental architecture vastly. Another person that can relate and expand Donald's 
theory is cognitive scientist Joaquin M. Fuster. Fuster presents a unique feature of the 
human person which has emerged through evolution. Fuster calls this "memory of the 
future." The human brain is highly adaptive and interacts continuously with its 
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environment. It maintains a continuous perception/action cycle that can integrate the past 
with the future. Fuster will show a convergence of the perceptual ability of the brain in the 
present, and this convergence enables the brain to make decisions into the future. Drawing 
patterns across scientific theories can give us better insight to the emergence of the human 
person possessing consciousness with a sense of self. 
In the final part of this chapter, I will offer a working definition of emergence and 
discuss the limitations of the argument. Using the scientific perspective of emergence, I 
will explain how it can give robustness to Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence in 
the third chapter. 
Part A 
1. Emergence and Complexity 
The universe is an open question. It is a mystery. History shows us that the 
questions 'why' and 'how' occupied the minds of philosophers through the ages. Today, 
science asks these same questions and offers theories that help us to better understand the 
universe in which we live. It is a misconception that science presents us with theories that 
are based on observable facts alone. Theologian and physicist Ian Barbour argues that 
theories of science "involve novel concepts and hypotheses not found in data, and they 
often refer to entities and relationships that are not directly observable."145 Theories of 
science may influence the observation of data, and the "form of questions we asked 
145 Barbour, Religion and Science, 106. 
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determines the kind of answer we receive." 146 Barbour references the work of physicist and 
historian Thomas Kuhn, who argued that "scientific data are strongly dependent on 
dominant paradigms. " 147 A paradigm is "a cluster of conceptual and methodological 
presuppositions embodied in an exemplary body of scientific work."148 Creativity coupled 
with imagination may cause a scientific paradigm shift and, thus, affect our view and 
understanding of the world, such as the "Newtonian mechanics in the eighteenth century 
or relativity and quantum physics in the twentieth century." 149 On this point, Barbour states 
that "science does not lead to certainty. Its conclusions are always incomplete, tentative, 
and subject to revision." 15° Furthermore, "theories change in time, and we should expect 
current theories to be modified or overthrown, as previous ones have been. " 151 In the history 
of science, there has been "a sequence of better and better theories or models, from Plato 
to the classical theory of Newton to modem quantum theories." 152 However, Barbour 
points out that "science does offer reliable procedures for testing and evaluating theories 
by a complex set of criteria."153 
The scientific perspective of emergence is similar in this respect. It is a perspective 
by which one can view and understand the universe in which one lives. Philosopher and 
146 Barbour, Religion and Science, 108. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid., 110 
151 Ibid. 
152 Hawking and Mlodinow, The Grand Design, 7. 
153 Barbour, Religion and Science, I 10. 
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theologian Philip Clayton states that "emergence is the philosophical position - more 
accurately, the philosophical elaboration of a series of scientific results - that best 
expresses the philosophical import of evolutionary theory." 154 It is the "naturalist position 
most strongly supported by a synthetic scientific perspective - that is, by the study of 
natural history across the various levels it has produced - as well as by philosophical 
reflection. " 155 
The common use of the term emergence "refers to processes of coming forth from 
latency, or to states of things arising unexpectedly." 156 It is generally recognized that the 
term 'emergence ' was first used as a philosophical concept by English Philosopher George 
Henry Lewes in his 187 5 Problems of Life and Mind. The term was popularized when it 
was embraced by the British school of philosophy (usually referred to as British 
emergentists) in the 1920s, in particular Samuel Alexander, C. Lloyd Morgan, and C.D. 
Broad. 157 The emergence theory "was formed as a meta-scientific interpretation of 
evolution in all its forms: cosmic, biological , mental , and cultural." 158 
Gregersen tells us that there are three generally accepted views on which 
emergentists can agree, even if"they differ in metaphysical orientation."159 First, emergents 
are qualitative novelties, for example, "weight is a "resulting property of aggregating 
154 Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 2. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Niels Henrik Gregersen, "Emergence and Complexity," in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and 
Science (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 767. 
157 Paul Davies, preface to The Re-Emergence of Emergence, ed. Philip Clayton and Paul Sheldon 
Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), x. Gregersen, "Emergence and Complexity," 767. 
158 Gregersen, "Emergence and Complexity," 767. 
159 Ibid. 
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matter, whereas the liquidity and surface tension of water are new, emergent qualities in 
relation to the chemical compounds of hydrogen and oxygen." 160 Next, nature is a nested 
hierarchy of ontological levels, meaning that "the higher emergent levels ( e.g., living 
organisms) include the lower levels (e.g. , inorganic chemistry), on which they are based." 
Finally, emergents are explanatory holists, which is to say that the "higher levels are not 
predictable from our knowledge of their constituent parts, and their operations are often in 
principle irreducible to the lower levels." 161 This also means that bottom-up "microphysical 
causation must be supplemented by various forms of top-down causation in order to 
account for the properties and functions of the higher levels." 162 From the three views, this 
chapter will consider the nested hierarchy of ontological levels and explanatory holists , 
which fall under the ontological argument of emergence. 
Deacon puts forth a supportive view, stating that emergence is a term "most often 
used by scientists to describe the spontaneous appearance of unprecedented orderliness in 
nature." 163 He argues that the term has been around for a century and was relevant in so far 
as it could be used to explain the "unprecedented nature oflife and of mind with respect to 
the other physical processes." 164 The term emergence today "connotes the image of 
something coming out of hiding, coming into view for the first time - something without 
160 Gregersen, "Emergence and Complexity," 767. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Terrence Deacon, "Emergence: The Hole at the Wheel's Hub," in The Re-Emergence of 
Emergence, ed. Philip Clayton and Paul Sheldon Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 121 . 
164 Ibid. 
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precedent and perhaps a bit surprising."165 Thus, "emergence used in this context is 
intended to convey the something-from-nothing impression that is produced when 
unprecedented properties are produced spontaneously without the intervention of external 
modification of a system."166 Deacon posits that most uses of the "emergence concept 
implicitly assume an effect that is manifested at ascending levels of scale. Natural 
phenomena that are described as emergent tend to be mostly compositional in some 
sense."167 Deacon also states that scale is important in the discussion of emergence because 
"an increased number of components increases iterative interaction possibilities." 168 He 
adds, "With every iterated interaction, relational properties are multiplied with respect to 
each other, so an increase in numbers of elements and chances increases the relative 
importance of interaction parameters and related contextual variables." 169 'Iterative' 
essentially means 'repetition' or 'frequency'. This also presents us with a way to 
understand the term 'complexity' as it is most often used in emergence. Deacon states that 
a more extensive definition of emergence might be something like an "unprecedented 
global regularity generated within a composite system by virtue of the higher-order 
consequences of the interactions of composite parts. " 170 
Although Clayton argues on a similar point on the iterative model of emergence, 
he expresses reservations on the preciseness of Deacon' s theory, especially on his three 
165 Deacon, "Emergence," in Clayton and Davis, 121. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid ., 121-122. 
170 Ibid., 122. 
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steps of emergent complexity as detailed in Deacon's paper on "The Hierarchic Logic of 
Emergence."17 1 Clayton was critical of Deacon's claim that in the iterative process, "stage 
three emergence does not become a new starting point for a further process of emergent 
complexity leading to new emergent wholes" and that "the system has achieved all the 
ontological complexity there is to achieve." 172 Clayton's critique makes sense if Deacon's 
statement means that a process of'development' or 'becoming' stops in a system. Deacon's 
argument indicates that there comes a point in time when there can be no further increase 
in matter that can give rise to novel emergents that are unpredictable, surprising, and 
irreducible. 
However, Clayton agrees with Deacon that increasing complexity within a system 
"under certain conditions gives rise to emergent entities or units and they in tum becomes 
more complex" until they produce further units that are "basic causal agents in their own 
right, and the process begins again." 173 Clayton also noted that for this iterative model to 
be correct, it would mean that "no single scientific discipline can express the precise nature 
of emergence; emergence is a pattern that runs on a variety of different platforms. " 174 
Clayton makes a valid point. First, the idea of complexity is central to the discussion 
of emergence, supporting the scientific claims of the hierarchical levels in the processes of 
nature. The iterative model provides a framework to understanding what complexity 
17 1 See Terrence Deacon, "The Hierarchic Logic of Emergence: Untangling the Interdependence or 
Evolution and Self-Organization," in Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered, ed. John 
Heil and Alfred Mele (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 73. Deacon speaks of thermodynamics, 
morphodynamics, and teleodynamics as the process that leads to the emergence of life from matter. 
172 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 46. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. 
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entails. Second, the emergence perspective offers a means to discern and integrate 
scientific discoveries toward a wider understanding of ourselves and this universe we call 
home. 
Gregersen points out that '"emergence' and 'complexity' often travel together."175 
However, he also points out that not all "emergents arise from complexity, for quite a few 
emergent phenomena, such as consciousness, take place by leaving out information, or by 
ex-formation or de-complexification of neural firings." 176 He states that the "sensation of 
something like ' scarlet red' is much simpler than an accurate description of the 
environmental , sensory, and neural processes involved in the production of that particular 
qualia."177 That means that there can be a "series of arrows leading from complexity to 
emergence to simplicity." 178 There can also be "cases that the arrow goes the other way 
round, as when a fascination with scarlet red and other colours leads someone to become a 
painter and thereby participate in the wider cultural circulation of paintings, schools of 
painters, galleries, art buyers, and newspaper reviews." 179 Gregersen notes that in this case, 
the "arrow goes from low-degree complexity to emergence to high-degree complexity. " 180 
There are levels of complexity ranging from the complexation of molecular 
interactions resulting in water or ice to complexity in evolution, spanning across time. This 
thesis takes the point of view that complexity must be considered both from a wider 
175 Gregersen, "Emergence and Complexity," 768. 
176 Ibid., 772. 
177 Ibid., 772-773. 
178 Ibid., 773. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
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perspective and through the lens of time. The process involved when life emerges from a 
single cell continues in an upward trajectory, with an increase in complexity until plant and 
animal life emerges. Thus, the wider perspective is to recognize that matter does increase 
in complexity, and this complexity results in novel emergent properties such as the mind 
and consciousness. 
Physicist Paul Davies, who points out that it is not a simple matter to distinguish 
precisely between random and organized complexity, also affirms my point above about 
complexity, which must be considered from the perspective of time. For example, "we can 
see a box of gas molecules rushing around at random and the elaborately organized activity 
of a bacterium." 181 One clear fact is that "organized complexity of the sort exemplified by 
life . .. [has] been forged over deep time, through elaborate processing of matter and energy 
and the operation ofratchets to lock in the products of this processing." 182 
Emergence is a scientific perspective that depends on the research and discoveries 
of scientists to understand the processes of the universe wherein complexity increases over 
'deep time', resulting in the emergence of something higher from something lower. It is 
because there is a recognition of the lower and higher that we can speak of a hierarchy of 
levels. The irreducibility of nature is the other aspect of which we will speak in the next 
section. 
Gregersen points out that the theory of emergence developed during the period of 
the Darwinian revolution of science was flatlined during the reductionist climate in the 
181 Paul Davies, "Introduction: Towards an Emergentist Worldview," in From Complexity to Life: 
On the Emergence of Life and Meaning, ed. Niels Hendrik Gregersen (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 7. 
182 Ibid. 
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philosophy of science between the 1930s and 1960s, revived again in the 1970s thanks to 
computer studies of complexity, and has since been supported by anti-reductionist trends 
within the philosophy of science. 183 Thus, it is helpful to explore one context in which the 
theory of emergence has been used, namely, against the reductionist perspective. 
2. The 'Whole' is more than the 'Parts': The Problem of Reductionism 
Harold Morowitz writes that Pope John Paul II once asked scientist and 
psychologist John Holland the following question: "How are we to reconcile the 
explanation of the world ... with the recognition that the whole is more than the sum of its 
parts?"184 The pope was looking at a perspective beyond the reductionist perspective, which 
states that the parts explain the whole. One way to grasp the meaning of emergence is to 
study the context of its usage, thereby addressing the reductionism perspective. 
Barbour speaks of a form of epistemology called scientific materialism, which 
asserts that matter is the fundamental reality in the universe and the scientific method is 
the only reliable path to knowledge. 185 According to Barbour, "many forms of materialism 
express reductionism," which is to say that "the laws and theories of all the sciences are in 
principle reducible to the laws of physics and chemistry." 186 More importantly, scientists 
and those who accept this view claim that "the component parts of any system determine 
183 Gregersen, "Emergence and Complexity," 768. 
184 Harold J. Morowitz, The Emergence of Everything: How the World Became Complex (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 23. Morowitz writes that this was in 1992, when the Pope was giving the 
allocution to the plenary session of the Pontifical Academy of Science on "The Emergence of Complexity in 
Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, and Biology." 
185 Ian G. Barbour, When Religion Meets Science (New York: HarperOne, 2000), 11. 
186 Ibid. 
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its behavior."187 For example, Francis Crick, co-discoverer of DNA (deoxyribonucleic 
acid), opens his book The Astonishing Hypothesis with the following statement: "The 
Astonishing Hypothesis is that 'you,' your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your 
ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the 
behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules .... 'You're 
nothing but a pack of neurons. "'188 Davies states, "The philosophy that the whole is nothing 
but the sum of its parts is known as reductionism, and it has exercised a powerful grip on 
scientific thinking." 189 He says that if the world is already explained at the level of 
subatomic physics, then the notion of complexity loses most of its significance since the 
lower levels explain everything. 190 This claim will even challenge what it means to be alive 
because "no atom in the human body is living, and human bodies are nothing but a 
combination of atoms." 191 
Clayton states that the "discussion of emergence has grown out of the successes 
and the failures of the scientific quest for reduction." 192 The re-emergence of the 
"emergence theories presuppose that the once-popular project of complete explanatory 
reduction - that is, explaining all phenomena in the natural world in terms of the objects 
and laws of physics - is finally impossible."193 The limitations of the philosophical position 
187 Barbour, When Religion Meets Science, 11 . 
188 Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul (New York: 
Scribner, 1994 ), 3. 
189 Davies, "Towards an Emergentist Worldview," 4. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Philip Clayton, "Conceptual Foundations of Emergence Theory," in Clayton and Davies, 1. 
193 Ibid. 
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of reductionism does not mean that science will stop trying to explain "phenomena in terms 
of their constituent parts and underlying laws."194 Taking either the reductionistic 
perspective or the perspective of emergence presupposes an understanding of natural 
science with its goals, epistemic status, and relations to other areas of study, and this will 
affect how scientists choose to pursue their discoveries and view their results. 195 
Emergence moves in the opposite direction, which is "from the wholes to the 
parts." 196 That the 'whole' is more than its 'parts' is an important aspect of how we can see 
and understand the universe. For example, the human person cannot be understood merely 
by the activities of the brain. As theology tends to look at the bigger picture, emergence 
has also "become a central and almost necessary category for many theologians engaged 
with the sciences."197 For example, the perspective of emergence can add to the richness 
of how we can see and understand ourselves and the universe we live in. It enables physicist 
and theologian John Polkinghorn to claim that "many dimensions of the rich reality of 
creation intersect in the human person."198 The reductionist approach can contribute greatly 
to the understanding of the human person. For example, the reductionists approach gave 
us the DNA, but it does not tell the whole story and "any adequate anthropology will have 
to do justice to these multiple dimensions of humanity." 199 Theologian Gregory Peterson 
writes that the "theories of emergence provide a framework that makes scientific and 
194 Clayton, "Conceptual Foundations Emergence Theory," 1. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Morowitz, The Emergence of Everything, 14. 
197 Gregory R. Peterson, "Species of Emergence," Zygon, vol. 41 , no. 3 (September 2006): 689. 
198 John C. Polkinghorn, "Towards an Integrated Anthropology," in Welker, 79. 
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theological claims compatible, even to the point of allowing the two to be yoked together 
into a single synthesis."200 A reductionist stance can result in "a worldview that ultimately 
denies the reality of higher-order pattern of entity, including the mind and ethical values. " 201 
Goodenough and Deacon's essay "The Sacred Emergence of Nature" tells us that 
emergence puts back together broken fragments that were taken apart by the reductionist 
approach. 202 While acknowledging how "reductionism has yielded splendid results in 
science, there is an important sense in which it is artificial, and in this sense false."203 For 
example, by starting "from wholes and moving 'down' into parts, one is moving in the 
opposite direction from the way matters arise."204 For emergentists, "to grasp how matters 
arise, one must run the muscle movie backwards, from the subatom to the atom to the 
amino acid to the protein to the polymer to the cell to the muscle to the contraction."205 
According to them, it is important to begin the movie with "reductionist understandings 
[because] otherwise, there is no way to know what to put in the movie."206 Thus, "once it 
is understood how proteins fold and myosin hydrolyses ATP and so on, [then] it is possible 
200 Peterson, "Species of Emergence," 689. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ursula Goodenough and Terrence W. Deacon, "The Sacred Emergence ofNature," in The Oxford 
Handbook of Religion and Science, 854. To be specific, the example is on the broken egg fragments of 
Humpty Dumpty. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid. 
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to narrate such understandings in the correct temporal and spatial sequence, movmg 
'upwards ' from one level to the next."207 
Goodenough and Deacon state that scientists who engage in such 'upward' projects 
"quickly arrive at an understanding that has in fact been around for some time."208 They 
present two phrases that are important to how we can understand and describe emergence. 
First, they say that "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. "209 Second, they claim 
that "as one moves 'up' in levels of scale, one encounters 'something more from nothing 
but' or, less euphoniously but more accurately, 'something else from nothing but. "'210 They 
note that "the point is not that one encounters something greater or something more, but 
that one encounters something else altogether."211 According to them, "this something else 
can, in turn, participate in generating a new something else at a different level of 
organization. That is, today's something else may be tomorrow' s nothing but," and "the 
now widely adopted term to describe such dynamics is emergence. "212 
On the concept of emergence itself, Goodenough and Deacon writes, "Emergence 
not only surrounds us in the non-living world; it is also the key dynamic of living 
organisms, as in, for example, the emergence of contractility (something else) from the 
interaction of myosin and actin polymers (nothing but)."213 They state that "life has a 
207 Goodenough and Deacon, "Sacred Emergence of Nature," 854. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid. 
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number of additional features, however, and these are perhaps best appreciated by 
considering ways that life may have emerged from non-life."2 14 Goodenough and Deacon 
also state that "all origin-of-life hypotheses are by definition speculative, since the default 
assumption is that the original lifeform is no longer extant but went on to evolve into the 
DNA-based, lipid-membrane-enclosed, protein-mediated, single-celled organisms that 
served as the common ancestors of all modem lifeform."2 15 
While the concept of emergence makes a good case against reductionism in many 
important ways, the concept itself is more significant than that. Deacon particularly makes 
this point. The use of emergence as merely anti-reductionist will result in the use of 
emergence to fill in the gaps where "standard reductionistic accounts seem to be incomplete 
in explaining apparent discontinuities."2 16 He states that this negative use of emergence 
"serves only as a philosophically motivated promissory note for a missing explanation that, 
critics argue, is needed to fill in a gap."217 
The core arguments here are that the whole is more than the parts and that the whole 
is not reducible to the parts. The reductionist perspective is important for understanding 
the parts, but the perspective of emergence can help us see the bigger picture, such as 
recognizing that we are more than our cells. Also, the term emergence can connote 
'encounter' . For example, one encounters something new, and this something new can, in 
tum, participate in generating a new something else at a different level of organization. 
214 Goodenough and Deacon, "Sacred Emergence of Nature," 854. 
2 15 Ibid. 
216 Deacon, "Emergence," 123 . 
2 17 Jbid. 
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3. Concepts of Emergence 
Gregersen has told us earlier that "in ordinary language 'emergence' refers to 
processes of coming forth from latency, or to a state of things arising unexpectedly."21 8 In 
his paper, he presents "a short philosophical primer consisting of four types of emergence 
theory, two epistemological and two ontological."219 There are questions associated with 
the emergent phenomena, such as "what is actually emerging?"220 Does what actually 
emerges have "only properties, with no causal roles, or is it properties that involve new 
causal capacities, some of which may even be formulated in the form of emergent laws?" 
Also, can we "legitimately speak of new emergent individuals?"221 According to 
Gregersen, these questions "are linked to the fundamental distinction between 'weak' and 
'strong' claims of emergence."222 
Given the broadness of the concepts of emergence, Table I below presents an 
overview of the argument outlined in the following pages. Table I spells out the claims of 
what emergence, its meanings, and characteristics. It will also show how part B, which is 
on the evolutionary development of the human person, fits into the argument of this thesis. 
Hopefully, this will be helpful as we delve deeper into the topic. In chapter three, I will 
demonstrate how the characteristics of emergence discussed in this chapter can enrich the 
notion of active self-transcendence. 
218 Gregersen, "Emergence and Complexity," 767. 
219 Ibid., 769. 
220 Ibid., 775. 
22 1 Ibid. 
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Table 1: A brief outline on the discussion on emergence in this chapter. 
Part A 
3. Concepts of Emergence Meanings and Characteristics 
What is actually emerging? The questions 3.2 Five Different Meanings of Emergence (52) 
are related to the distinctions between weak 
and strong claims of emergence below. ( 49) E1 (Emergence meaning one) refers to theories of 
3.1. E(!istemological (Weak) Emergence emergence within specific scientific fields. (53) 
and Ontological (Strong) Emergence E2 refers to the levels of emergence within the 
natural world. (55) 
Egistemological (Weak) Emergence ( 51) E3 refers to patterns across scientific theories. (The first concept has two parts) (55-56) 
Emergence1 is a purely logical or E4 refers to a theory about patterns in the 
computational formofemergence. (52) transitions between sciences. (56) 
Emergence2 "refers to cases where new Es refers to the metaphysics of emergence. (56-57) 
physical properties appear but are fully 
dependent on their subvenient physical 
bases.(52) 3.3 Characteristics of Emergence (55) 
Ontological (Strong) Emergence (51) (3 .3. I) monism (57-58) 
(The second concept also has two parts) 
Emergence3 "refers to cases where new 
(3.3.2) hierarchical complexity (58-59) 
emergent properties, based on new spatial or (3 .3 .3) no monolithic law of emergence ( 59-61) 
hierarchical configurations, acquire new 
causal capacities in the context of relatively (3 .3.4) patterns across levels of emergence (61-
enduring higher-order systems."(52) 62) 
Emergence4 refers to special cases when 
new emergent properties are based on new (3.3 .5) downward causation (62) 
spatial or hierarchical configurations and 
"give rise to new causal capacities in the 
context of relatively enduring higher-order 
systems exhibiting not only self-referential 
but also self-reflective and unified features 
such as human consciousness.(54) 
\ J 
y 
Part B 
An Evolutionary Perspective of the Human Person 
The scientific perspective of emergence can show how something lower can emerge and develop into 
something higher, in this case, properties of"openness" and "wide horizon" in one's consciousness. 
\ 
T 
PartC 
Definitions and Clarifications 
This section will offer a working definition to the scientific perspective of emergence and come 
clarifications. 
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3.1. Epistemological (Weak) Emergence and Ontological (Strong) Emergence 
Weak emergence holds that "systemic features at 'higher' ( or more comprehensive) 
levels cannot be predicted by any finite knower from the standpoint of the pre-emergent 
stage, despite a knowledge of the empirical characters and governing laws concerning the 
ultimate constituents of that system."223 Weak emergence is also known as "epistemological 
emergence, since all the causal work is done at the base level. "224 
Regarding strong emergence, Gregersen states, "Emergent phenomena obtain new 
causal capacities, which make it possible that higher-level or more comprehensive systems 
can exert a top-down, selective influence on the lower-level (or local) constituents than 
would otherwise have obtained."225 Strong emergence is also termed "ontological, since 
what is causally effective must be deemed real."226 
Gregersen points out that weak emergence can "also accord a sort of reality to the 
higher-order qualities; namely the reality of being an epiphenomenon that should 
nonetheless be taken with metaphysical seriousness, even if the emergent properties play 
no causal role of their own."227 On this, the "strong emergentist will admit that in many 
cases emergent properties are only epiphenomena, without any new causal capacities."228 
One would have to investigate to determine whether an emergent phenomenon manifests 
as weak or strong emergence. 
223 Gregersen, "Emergence and Complexity," 775. 
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The two epistemological emergences (weak emergences) are Emergence' and 
Emergence2. Emergence' is a purely logical or computational form of emergence, as 
investigated in strong programmes of computational complexity (CC). For example, Stuart 
Kauffman worked within the paradigm of CC with the aim of explaining the evolutionary 
appearance of life through a bottom-up computational approach. 229 Emergence1 is not 
"necessarily related to the real physical world (apart from the fact that computer programs 
are implemented on the hardware of Newtonian machines)."230 Emergence2 "refers to cases 
where new physical properties appear, but are fully dependent on their subvenient physical 
bases. These properties are nothing but properties or attributes of the underlying level or 
levels, and ultimately properties of physics."231 An example of this will be the "emergence 
of water strictly based on the intrinsic chemical properties ofH20. ''232 
Emergence3 and Emergence4 are ontological or strong emergence. Emergence3 
"refers to cases where new emergent properties, based on new spatial or hierarchical 
configurations, acquire new causal capacities in the context of relatively enduring higher-
order systems."233 Here, the emergent systems are not susceptible to their environments but 
"are able to follow their own programmatic 'ends' even under changing circumstances 
(say, the search for food when there is no food immediately available). "234 
229 Gregersen, "Emergence and Complexity," 771. 
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Emergence4 refers to special cases where new emergent properties are based on 
new spatial or hierarchical configurations and "give rise to new causal capacities in the 
context of relatively enduring higher-order systems exhibiting not only self-referential but 
also self-reflective and unified features such as human consciousness. In this case one 
might speak of emergent individuals."235 The fourth case of emergence might be 
controversial "since it assumes the existence of body-mind systems that have the form of 
self-conscious unity, a form that is usually ascribed only to human persons."236 Gregersen 
notes that Clayton refers to this as "emergentist pluralism" and this allows Clayton to see 
"the emergence of the human mind as continuous with other sorts of self-reproducing 
systems," and as such, the "human person acts as a responsible person in relation to the 
environment and to him or herself."237 They "have the feature of being centres of intentions 
and autonomous actions."238 This is because "what emerges in the human case is a 
particular psycho-somatic unity, an organism that can do things both mentally and 
physically."239 Clayton points out that we need sciences or modes of study to address the 
level of complexity that is the human person. By this, Clayton means that he believes in 
"the real existence and causal efficacy of the conscious or mental dimension of human 
personhood. "240 
235 Gregersen, "Emergence and Complexity," 776. 
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Following Gregersen ' s discussion, this thesis leans toward ontological or strong 
emergence. Strong emergence is closer to the evolutionary perspective of the universe and 
oflife. Gregersen describes an emergent that which wants to follow its own programmatic 
'ends ' or higher-order systems exhibiting not only self-referential but also self-reflective 
and unified features such as human consciousness. A description by neurologist Antonio 
Damasio is an example of strong emergence. He states that every cell in the human body 
is made of cells that have exhibited intelligent and purposive behaviors not only for 
survival but also for thriving by pooling resources, so to speak, with other cells. He says 
that even "single cells had what appeared to be a decisive, unshakable determination to 
stay alive for as long as the genes inside their microscopic nucleus commanded them to do 
so."241 
3.2. Five Different Meanings of Emergence 
Clayton points out that emergence is a term that is not easily defined. He says that 
there are no neutral definitions because "every conceptual clarification is actually a plea 
for the reader to look at a subject in a particular way."242 If pressed for a definition, Clayton 
says that he would describe emergence as "the theory that cosmic evolution repeatedly 
includes unpredictable, irreducible, and novel appearances. "243 
In Mind and Emergence, Clayton discusses five meanings of emergence that might 
help in the consideration of "what is the topic that emergence addresses" because in a 
241 Antonio Damasio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain (20 IO; reprint, New 
York: Pantheon Books, 2012) , 37. 
242 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 38-39. 
243 Ibid. , 39. 
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broader discussion, emergence has been used in multiple fields. 244 Examining the meanings 
of the term at each level, we can observe a "transition from very specific scientific domains 
to increasingly integrative, and hence increasingly philosophical, concepts."245 
The first meaning, E 1, refers to theories of emergence within specific scientific 
fields and describes "features of a specified physical or biological system of which we have 
some scientific understanding."246 The specificity of the theory makes it difficult to 
establish a connection with other fields of science. 
fa refers to the levels of emergence within the natural world, such as "Stuart 
Kauffman's notion of a new 'general biology' or in certain proposed theories of complexity 
or self-organization."247 On this, fa "expresses postulated connections or laws that may in 
the future become the basis for one or more branches of science."248 
E3 refers to patterns across scientific theories, and since "it postulates features that 
are shared by multiple theories within science, E3 is actually a meta-scientific terrn."249 fa 
does not refer to a specific theory but an "observation about a significant pattern that 
allegedly connects a range of scientific theories," such as the common features found in 
"autocatalysis, complexity, and self-organization."250 The common feature can serve as a 
heuristic function and "recognizing such broader patterns can help to extend existing 
244 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 40. 
245 Ibid. 
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theories, to formulate insightful new hypotheses, or to launch new interdisciplinary 
research programmes. "25 1 
E4 refers to a theory about patterns in the transitions between sciences, and in this 
sense, it is a "broader theory about the evolutionary process."252 fa looks for the common 
features between theories, but E4 goes beyond in its "attempt to explain why these patterns 
should exist," while also allowing one to argue that "similarities and differences across 
emergent systems are part of a broader pattern in nature."253 An example of this is the 
current work "to understand how chemical structures emerge out of the underlying physics, 
to reconstruct the biochemical dynamics that underlie the origins of life, and to conceive 
how complicated neural processes produce cognitive phenomena such as memory, 
language, rationality, and creativity."254 E4 allows one to discern the broader patterns, but 
in itself, it is not a scientific theory. 
Es refers to the metaphysics of emergence, and it presents hypotheses about the 
nature of reality as a whole. One may draw evidence or points from EI to E4, but 
"metaphysical theories are not limited to the inferences from the available evidence."255 An 
example of this is Clayton's conclusion that the implications of the consideration of 
emergence lead to transcendence. 
The work of this thesis takes the meaning of emergence in E4 and Es. For example, 
the emergence of the human person is related to the broader pattern of the universe. This 
251 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 41 . 
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pattern can only be discerned at a broader level, and it includes the conditions that are 
favorable to life at the beginning of the universe, right through to the development of 
culture, which makes the expansion of the human brain possible. Es is particularly 
important for relating theology and science, as we can see in the work of Clayton on 
emergence and transcendence. 256 
3.3. Characteristics of Emergence 
This thesis has explored the perspective, concepts, and meanings of emergence. 
Exploring the meaning above tells us of its significance to the discussion of the scientific 
perspective of emergence. This thesis will now highlight five characteristics of emergence. 
These are the properties, features, or traits that pertain to the scientific perspective of 
emergence. They are by no means exhaustive, and we have seen some of them earlier. The 
characteristics are as follows: (1) monism, (2) hierarchical complexity, (3) no monolithic 
law of emergence, (4) patterns across levels of emergence, and (5) downward causation. 
This section will explain what these characteristics are. It is in the next chapter that I will 
show how these characteristics are important to the discussion of emergence. 
3.3.1 . Monism 
One important feature of emergence is monism. It states that "reality is ultimately 
composed of one basic kind of stuff."257 Clayton calls this "ontological monism" and notes 
256 Clayton presents an overarching metaphysics in his work In Quest of Freedom, which speaks of 
the emergence of spirit in the natural world. Drawing on various theories about patterns in the transitions 
between sciences, Clayton presented hypotheses about the nature of reality as a whole. This reality includes 
freedom and self-transcendence. See Philip Clayton, In Quest of Freedom: The Emergence of Spirit in the 
Natural World, ed. Michael G. Parker and Thomas M. Schmidt (Gottingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2009), 141. 
257 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 4. 
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that this is different from physicalism, which says that everything is physical and only the 
law of physics applies.258 This perspective aligns with the theory that the universe began 
with the Big Bang and that there can be a trajectory from matter to life. It also gives ground 
to the next characteristic, which is hierarchical complexity. 
3.3.2. Hierarchical complexity 
Hierarchical complexity recognizes that there is a hierarchical structure in the world 
that has been in place since the beginning of the universe. This characteristic takes into 
account the evolutionary perspective of the universe. Mathematician and physicist George 
Ellis states, "The emergence of complex structure, including conscious life, from simpler 
physical structures is based on tightly structured non-linear relations between components, 
designed to produce specific higher-level functioning."259 Ellis describes self-conscious 
human beings as the "highest level of emergence. "260 Each higher level will have more 
entities "but fewer kinds of entities at the lower levels (atoms are made just of protons, 
neutrons, and electrons), so complex objects with complex behaviour are made by highly 
structured combinations of simpler objects with simpler behaviour."26 1 What happens at 
the next level higher in terms of physical causation is caused by the lower levels. 262 The 
"existence of higher-level complex behaviour, which does not occur at the lower levels, 
then emerges from the lower-level properties both structurally and functionally (at each 
258 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 4. 
259 George F.R. Ellis, "On the Nature of Emergent Reality," in Clayton and Davies, 79-80. 
260 Ibid. , 81 . 
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moment) and in evolutionary and developmental terms (over time)."263 This is also an 
example of an increase in complexity and proof that the lower is contained in the higher 
but that the higher is a completely new emergent that had not previously existed before.264 
Refer to Table 2 below for the hierarchy of structure. Clayton tells us that the "rapid 
expansion of solid empirical work in complexity theory now allows us to quantify the 
increase in complexity, at least in some cases."265 
Table 2. The hierarchy of structure 
Sociology/ Politics/ Economics 
Animal Behavior/ Psychology 
Botany/ Zoology/ Physiology 
Cell Biology 
Biochemistry/ Molecular Biology 
Molecular Chemistry 
Atomic Physics 
Nuclear Physics 
Particle Physics 
Source: Ellis, "On the Nature of Emergent Reality," 80. 
3.3.3. No monolithic law of emergence 
No monolithic law of emergence is another characteristic that is important to the 
scientific perspective of emergence. Clayton points out that many "of the details of the 
process of emergence - the manner of the emergence of one level from another, the 
qualities of the emergent level, the degree to which the 'lower' controls the 'higher,' etc. -
263 Ellis, "Nature of Emergent Reality," 80. 
264 Arthur Peacocke presented similar but more detailed hierarchical levels in his work. Arthur 
Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming - Natural, Divine, and Human (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1993), 2 I 7. 
265 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 60. 
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vary greatly depending on which instance of emergence one is considering."266 This 
characteristic is important in relation to E4. Not having a monolithic law of emergence will 
allow one to explore and discern patterns in the transitions between sciences. 
The work of biophysicist Harold J. Morowitz is an example of why there should 
not be only one perspective on what constitutes emergence. He presents a "catalog of 28 
observed instances that have emergence in common but vary over an enormous range in 
the agents, interactions, hierarchical levels, and character of the interaction rules and the 
pruning rules."267 The twenty-eight observed instances of emergence are derived "from an 
almost linear chronological sequence from the beginning of the universe."268 The 
"complexity, diversity, and richness that we see today [in the universe,] on all scales of 
sizes have emerged since the beginning in a long sequence of physical process."269 The 
twenty-eight instances of emergence that Morowitz observed are the primordium, large-
scale cosmological structures, stars and nucleosynthesis, elements and the periodic table, 
solar systems, planetary structure, geospheres, metabolism, cells-prokaryotes, cells-
eukaryotes, multicellularity, neurons and animalness, deuterostomes, cephalization, fish, 
amphibians, reptiles, stem mammals, arboreal mammals, primates, apes, hominids, tool 
makers, language, agriculture, technology, philosophy, and the next emergence (i.e., the 
spirit).270 Morowitz's presentation gives us a sense of how broad the concept of emergence 
266 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 61 . 
267 Morowitz, The Emergence of Everything, 25. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Davies, "Towards an Emergentist Worldview," 3. 
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can be. It is understandable why Clayton states that "emergence should be viewed as a term 
of family resemblance."27 1 
3.3.4. Patterns across levels of emergence 
The point above connects us to the next important characteristic in the argument of 
emergence: patterns across levels of emergence. Clayton identifies five particular 
commonalities shared by various instances of emergence in natural history that we can 
recognize and defend. This does not eliminate other commonalities where they may exist. 
First, "LI is prior in natural history," and second, "L2 depends on L1 , such that if the states 
in L1 did not exist, the qualities in L2 would not exist."272 The third is the point that "L2 is 
the result of a sufficient degree of complexity in LI . In many cases one can even identify 
a particular level of criticality which, when reached, will cause the system to begin 
manifesting new emergent properties."273 In other words, an increase in complexity is 
necessary for a new emergent. This leads to the fourth point Clayton makes, which is that 
"one can sometimes predict the emergence of some new or emergent qualities on the basis 
of what one knows about L1 ."274 However, Clayton points out that using L1 will not allow 
one to "be able to predict (i) the precise nature of these qualities, (ii) the rules that govern 
their interaction ( or their phenomenological patterns), or (iii) the sorts of emergent levels 
to which they in tum may give rise in due course."275 The final important point in the 
271 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 61 . 
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perspective of emergence speaks to the irreducibility of emergence. Clayton states that "L2 
is not reducible to Ll in any of the standard senses of 'reduction' in the philosophy of 
science literature: causal, explanatory, metaphysical, or ontological reduction."276 
This relates to the fourth meaning of emergence in E4, which, as we have seen 
above, is concerning the theory about patterns in the transitions between sciences. Like E4, 
this allows one to discern the broader patterns, but in itself it is not a scientific theory. 
3.3.5. Downward causation 
The final characteristic is downward causation. The basic idea is that "L2 can 
exercise some causal effect on L1" at an ontological level. 277 Clayton states that "the world 
is such that it produces systems whose emergent properties exercise their own distinct 
causal influences on each other and on (at least) the next lower level in the hierarchy."278 
One example of downward-causation, or top-down causation, is by Donald Campbell 
(1974) to denote "the way in which the network of an organism's relationship to its 
environment and its behavior patterns together determine in the course of time the actual 
DNA sequences at the molecular level present in an evolved organism."279 However, "from 
a 'bottom-up' viewpoint of that organism once in existence, a molecular biologist would 
tend to describe its form and behavior as a consequence of the same DNA sequence."280 
276 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 61. 
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Campbell argues for a top-down causal role in the "evolutionary development of 
efficacious jaws made of suitable proteins in a worker termite."281 
Downward-causation, or top-down causation, tells us that there is an inter-
connectedness within the conditions of how something can emerge. Another example, 
which we will see in more detail, is the uniqueness of the human person, which has emerged 
during the evolutionary process and has also been shaped by their environment such as by 
culture. 
From here, we can see the broadness of the term emergence. The first part of this 
chapter has shown how it is related to the term complexity and its uses, such as against the 
position of reductionists. However, I pointed out that the understanding of emergence is 
broader by using Clayton ' s explanation of the variety of its meanings and characteristics. 
It does not seem complete without a concrete example, and the next section of this chapter 
will touch on the emergence of the human person from an evolutionary perspective. Even 
without the thesis intending to do so, one can observe that the broader patterns observed 
by Donald and Fuster in the next section will seem extraordinarily close to the 
transcendental anthropology of Rahner that we have seen in the first chapter, such as that 
the human person is 'open' and continually 'self-expanding'. 
28 1 Peacocke, "Complexity, Emergence, Divine Creativity," 191. 
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PartB 
In the second part of this chapter, I will propose that the human person, who has 
achieved consciousness, is essentially open and stands before a wide horizon. Furthermore, 
openness before a wide horizon is an emergent trait that comes from consciousness. 
Properties such as 'openness' or 'wide horizon' are things that are intangible. Nonetheless, 
I will demonstrate that they are real by using the scientific perspective of emergence that 
was discussed previously, showing the possibility of integrating a variety of patterns across 
levels of emergence as an example of how something lower can emerge and develop into 
something higher. 
4. The Transition to Hybrid-Minds 
Donald tells us that since "complex life evolved from inert matter, it follows that 
consciousness also evolved from inert matter."282 He calls this "emergentism," and it is a 
credible approach because consciousness is "an aspect of the natural world" and "must 
have evolved, like every other property of life."283 Donald's perspective is worth 
considering. Donald expands the model of how the human person emerged by focusing on 
more than the human person alone. He argues that human minds are not isolated. His 
"central thesis is that human beings have evolved a completely novel cognitive strategy: 
brain-culture symbiosis," which he calls 'hybrid-mind. ' 284 As a consequence of this 
symbiosis, "the human brain cannot realize its design potential unless it is immersed in a 
282 Merlin Donald, A Mind So Rare (New York: Norton, 2001), 96. 
283 Ibid. 
284 Brief introduction of Merlin Donald from Queen's university website, accessed on September 3, 
2016, www .queensu.ca/psycho logy/people/ emeritus-and-retired-fa cul ty/merlin-donald. 
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distributed communication network, that is, a culture, during its development. The human 
brain is, quite literally, specifically adapted for functioning in a complex symbolic 
culture."285 It must be greatly emphasized that the key to understanding how Donald sees 
human cognitive development lies in culture. Thus, his work speaks of the co-evolution of 
the brain and culture. Culture is the reason why we are the way we are today. To underscore 
the importance of culture, Donald states that any "serious failure to establish this social-
cognitive connection can result in delayed development and in some cases, such as autism, 
in a permanent developmental disability."286 In fact, the early cultural bond is important 
because "the human brain has evolved a dependency on culturally stored information for 
the realization of its design potential."287 
According to Donald, the great divide between humans and other species is the 
"computational divine," also known as the "symbolic computation."288 It is in this sense 
that Donald believes that we might be called "hybrid minds," as we maintain a balance 
between two computational modes of operation, which is part analog and part symbolic. 289 
As human persons, we operate with conventional nervous systems, but we are also capable 
of "constructing languages and symbols, such as those found in storytelling, art, and 
mathematics. These typify the symbolic mode."290 
285 Extracted from the university's website as above, accessed on September 3, 2016, 
www.queensu.ca/psychology/people/emeritus-and-retired-faculty/merlin-donald. 
286 Merlin Donald, "How Culture and Brain Mechanisms Interact in Decision Making," in Better 
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The language inside the human mind is a symbolic representation that arises from 
and describes phenomena outside the brain. For Donald, "culture leads, and mind follows. 
In other ways, mind leads. Symbolic culture is nothing without the human mind, while the 
human mind, without culture, remains locked in incoherently upon itself."29 1 
Many of the elements present in Donald's work agree with the research by Deacon, 
whose work has combined human evolutionary biology and neuroscience. In his book, 
Deacon calls human beings "symbolic species."292 He argues that "the doorway into this 
virtual world was opened to us alone by the evolution oflanguage, because language is not 
merely a mode of communication, it is also the outward expression of an unusual mode of 
thought - symbolic representation."293 Language makes possible the novelty that arises 
from the emergence of the human person. Language "offers a means for generating an 
essentially infinite variety of novel representations, and an unprecedented inferential 
engine for predicting events, organizing memories, and planning behaviors. "294 In addition, 
language "entirely shapes our thinking and the ways we know the physical world."295 
Donald presents three main transitions of human cognitive evolution. The 
transitions which caused three shifts in the nature of consciousness during our evolution, 
are as follows: (1) more precise and self-conscious control of action in mimesis, (2) richer 
and faster accumulation of cultural knowledge in speech, and (3) much more powerful and 
29 1 Donald, A Mind So Rare, 157. 
292 Terrence W. Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Brain (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1997). 
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abstract reflective cultures, driven by symbolic technology.296 They are important because 
the transitions demonstrate the expansion of the human person, which, among other things, 
resulted in the ability for symbolic capacity and openness. 
Donald places the mimesis stage in early hominins, peaking in homo erectus to be 
from about four million to four hundred thousand years ago. 297 According to Donald, "the 
first cognitive transition seems to have revolved around one central issue, the invention of 
culture as a collective means of accumulating experience and custom," and this was the 
"birth of the actor, the tribe, and the gesture."298 The stage of mimesis is the "result of 
evolving better conscious control over action."299 Donald states, "In its purest form, it is 
epitomized by four uniquely human abilities: mime, imitation, skill, and gesture ... , [and 
the] most basic form of mimetic action is mime, the imaginative reenactment of an 
event."300 Donald tells us that they are "direct offshoots of the human executive brain 
system and the Executive Suite."30 1 
The second transition to mythic culture was made by the early humans, peaking in 
homo sapiens about half a million years ago until today. 302 This transition was made 
possible by language. Donald writes that "the scattered, concrete repertoire of mimetic 
296 Donald, A Mind So Rare, 262. 
297 Merlin Donald, "Mimesis Theory Re-Examined, Twenty Years after the Fact," in Evolution of 
Mind, Brain, and Culture, ed. Gary Hatfield and Holly Pittman, (Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania Press, 
2013), 177. 
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culture came under the governance of narrative thought and ultimately, integrative 
myth."303 This stage preceded the appearance of modern homo sapiens. This stage is where 
"we gain new powers and can trade, amplify, and crystallize thoughts, remember with 
greater clarity, share memory, and enjoy membership in an enduring cognitive entity that 
transcends the individual."304 
The third transition is where we can truly speak of how the human person has 
emerged into something essentially higher in new and surprising ways. Donald tells us that 
the third transition can account for "astonishing changes that have taken place more 
recently," and "these changes revolve around one central trend that has dominated the 
history of the past 20 000 years: the externalisation of memory."305 In the past, people had 
to depend on their "natural or biological memory capacity."306 That is not so today. There 
are many factors that account for the emergence of the human person. For example, the 
human brain has grown in its plasticity, especially "in the way it carries out its cognitive 
business, individually and in groups, that the core configuration of skills that defines a 
mind actually varies significantly as a function of different kinds of culture. "307 The cultural 
factors that shape the human person give him or her literacy skills, and the ability for 
literacy changes the development of the brain. Donald asks us to consider what education 
does for the person. Please see Donald's diagram in Table 3 below. 
303 Merlin Donald, "The Definition of Human Nature," in The New Brain Sciences: Perils and 
Prospects, ed. David A. Rees and Steven P.R. Rose, 34-58 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
49. 
304 Donald, A Mind So Rare, 274 
305 Donald, "Definition of Human Nature," 52. 
306 Ibid. 
307 Donald, A Mind So Rare, 286. 
68 
Table 3. Bare outline of the literacy brain. 
SPOKEN WORD WRITTEN WORD 
L j L 'lt5L,A( A.'IIAL~S!S j 
[lfPfr-TfO SOt:"IO ·~•Vi£ EXPECTED•IJlSUAL ILIAOE 
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SPOKP,WORD WRITTEN WORD 
Source: Donald, A Mind So Rare, 303. 
This diagram shows a bare outline of the literacy brain, which includes several 
immensely complex neuronal networks that must be wired together and interwoven 
with the rest of the cognitive system when a brain learns to read and write. Since 
literacy skills are usually piggy-backed onto the speech system, the speech brain is 
also outlined in the figure, in a parallel column (left side) that traces the path of a 
spoken word as the brain processes it. The shaded boxes and thick black arrows 
highlight the special networks for written language. These must be added to the 
brain's basic network architecture when we learn to read or write. They include a 
reading vocabulary and a separate writing vocabulary, which does not always 
correspond to the reading one (this is usually the case in second languages). 
Reading and writing entail semi-independent networks .... 308 
According to Donald, "symbolic technology has changed the way we think, 
remember, and experience reality, individually and as a collectivity."309 Symbolic capacity, 
according to Donald's basic outline, has expanded the way one can experience the world 
and expand one's consciousness. Skills in literacy run parallel to the verbal symbolic 
capacity. Literacy opens up another dimension of living and enriches the horizons of a 
308 Donald, A Mind So Rare, 303. 
309 Ibid. 
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person. Being able to store memory externally reshapes the way that we, as persons, think, 
speak, and perceive. 
The paradigm Donald offers on the expanding consciousness of the human person 
as a result of his or her symbolic capacity developed through culture also shows what it 
means to be in the process of becoming something essentially higher. In this case, the 
process of active self-transcendence continues in a trajectory of orderly complexity at the 
lower level that makes up the brain, which allows for the expansion of awareness and 
consciousness of the human person possessing a 'self'. 
Donald continues his argument by stating that "the external memory field creates a 
mirror world of consciousness" that "reflects the architecture of biological memory back 
into the symbolic environment, and this mirror image is then reflected back into the 
brain."310 What happens then is that the core-consciousness of the human person stands in 
the middle "between two systems of representation, one stored inside the head and the other 
outside."311 The external memory "fundamentally changes the architecture of 
consciousness."312 Donald demonstrates this by presenting two diagrams. Table 4 shows 
the memory system stored inside the head and Table 5 shows the memory system stored 
both inside and outside the head. They are placed side by side for comparison. 
310 Donald, A Mind So Rare, 310. 
311 Ibid. 
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Table 4. Memory stored inside the 
head. 
LONG-TERM 
MEMOm 
LEVEL·3 
WORKING 
MEMORY 
I VIVID CONSCIOUS CORE I 
Source: Table 4, Donald, A Mind So Rare, 
310. Table 5, Donald, A Mind So Rare, 
311. 
Table 5. Memory stored inside and 
outside the head. 
LONG-TERM 
MEMORY 
LEVEL·3 
WORKING 
MEMORY 
I VIVID CONSCIOUS CORE I 
EXTERNAL 
MEMORY 
FIELD 
.... ······· ······· .... 
PERMANENT EXTERNAL 
SYMBOLIC STORAGE 
The "vivid conscious core" in the diagram is where the 'self-as-subject-and-knower' is 
present. Table 4 shows how we rely on our internal memory, which is limited, and how 
relying too heavily on our natural or biological memory limits us in our development. 
However, Table 5 shows that when we plug-in or connect ourselves to a powerful symbolic 
device, such as a book or the Internet, our operational mental architecture expands vastly. 
Our awareness as persons in this day and age always stands "between two simultaneously 
present storage systems, one internal and biological , the other external and technological , 
each with long-term and short-term aspects."313 Thus, driven by the creative driver that is 
our vivid conscious core, we can choose how we like to direct our awareness and develop 
better ways of thinking. 
313 Donald, A Mind So Rare, 311 . 
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5. Memory of the Future 
Fuster's study of the human brain is relevant to Donald's research. Donald tells us 
that the human level of awareness is different because the 'self-conscious' actor exists and 
because the human person is able to regulate his or her thoughts in immediate-and-longer-
term governance. This was due to the expansions of the prefrontal cortex and the new-
cerebellum in the brain system.314 Fuster tells us that the prefrontal cortex region plays an 
important part in the higher functions of the brain. The clinical neurological literature uses 
terms such as the "'supervisory system,' 'prioritizing function,' 'hierarchy formation,' and 
'working memory management"'.315 Fuster describes the general function of the prefrontal 
cortex as "the temporal organization of goal-directed in the domains of behavior, 
reasoning, and language."3 16 The pre-frontal cortex region has these five capacities: (1) 
integration of behavior over time, (2) establishment and manipulation of information in 
working memory, (3) maintenance of attention, (4) preparation for action, and (5) 
inhibitory control of behavior. 317 
Importantly, Fuster tells us that the human brain retains something of its past. It is 
what Donald describes as vestigial brains, through which "we have inherited a deep mental 
structure that is a direct reflection of the evolutionary history of our species."3 18 According 
to Fuster, the human brain cannot predict evolution, but it can predict the "consequences 
3 14 Donald, A Mind So Rare, 196. 
315 Ibid. 
316 Joaquin M. Fuster, The Neuroscience of Freedom and Creativity (New York: Cambridge 
University Press), 9. 
317 Joaquin M. Fuster, Cortex and Mind: Unifying Cognition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003). 
3 18 Donald, A Mind So Rare, 106. 
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of its action, with them to predict and shape further actions in a continuous cycle, the 
perception/action (PA) cycle, which functionally links the organism to its environment."31 9 
The PA cycle in the human person occurs in our prefrontal cortex. The prefrontal cortex 
"is the highest structure in that cycle, which integrates the past with the future - however 
near or distant either is - in the course of behavior, language, and reasoning."320 
There are three points that are important for the consideration of emergence. First, 
"the PA cycle also has deep roots in evolution."321 Second, "the human brain, which 
sustains the PA cycle with the cortex, is the most complex adaptive system in the universe. 
It is an open system like all living systems."322 This is why the human brain is "permanently 
in quasi-equilibrium but also in constant exchange with its environment to maintain that 
equilibrium."323 Finally, it is due to the "prefrontal cortex inserted in the PA cycle, the 
human brain, unlike any other, develops a prospective temporal dimension."324 This ability 
allows the human brain to make "advanced long-term adaptive changes in its 
environment."325 Fuster also adds that " language endows the human brain with the ability 
to record those changes, to codify them, and to institutionalize them."326 
3 19 Fuster, The Neuroscience of Freedom, 29. 
320 Ibid. 
321 Ibid. 
322 Ibid. 
323 Ibid. 
324 Ibid. 
325 Ibid. 
326 Ibid. 
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The ability to prepare for future events is what Fuster calls "memory of the 
future."327 The term 'future memory' seems odd when we consider that "there is no planned 
or future action without the memory, by association, of similar action in the past, by us or 
by others."328 However, "planning and decision-making consist in recreating old actions in 
new fashion."329 Planning for future actions means "devising new PA cycles with old 
cognits."330 As Fuster explains, "By doing this, the prefrontal cortex makes of the human 
brain a predictive organ, predictive of its own actions and of their consequences."33 1 He 
adds, "Insofar as the ability to decide, to plan, and to create new PA cycles is at the core of 
choosing between alternative courses of action, the prefrontal cortex makes the human 
brain free to act. "332 
Fuster' s framework on the brain's predictive ability also includes drawing from 
resources outside a person, namely, according to Donald, culture. Future memory does not 
only refer to immediate planning, such as what to eat for lunch tomorrow. This ability is 
also related to the process of seeking reward, usually for the good and well-being of the 
person. We can plug in and draw deeply from the external memories within our grasp and 
then find ourselves before a wide and an almost endless horizon. It can give the person a 
sense of freedom and newness. Consider the diagram presented by Fuster in Table 6. Fuster 
speaks of the convergence of all active forms of memory before making a decision. 
327 Fuster, The Neuroscience of Freedom, 124-156. 
328 Ibid., 126. 
329 Ibid. 
330 Ibid. 
33 1 Ibid. 
332 Ibid. 
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Table 6. Fuster's presentation of PA from the past, present and to the future 
Source: Fuster, The Neuroscience of Freedom, figure 5.1. 
The two cones of decision-making, the perceptual (P) converging on the present, 
the executive (A) diverging from it into the future. The converging influences 
originate in a multitude of cortical cognits representing all active forms of memory, 
in addition to the subcortical biological drives weighing on a decision. The decision 
is a resultant - chosen - executive vector of action among the many possible 
alternatives of action and 'affordance'. 333 
6. Cultural Scaffolding 
The idea of scaffolding affirms the work of Donald and Fuster. Donald writes that 
the external memory field, which gives us sharper and more durable mental 
representations, allows the conscious mind to reflect on thought itself and to evolve longer, 
more abstract, procedures that serve to verify and control the quality of its own actions.334 
That "results in a scaffolded cultural process that can accumulate and improve over 
time."335 Warren S. Brown argues that cultural scaffolding is a quality of human 
333 Fuster, The Neuroscience of Freedom, 141. 
334 Donald, A Mind So Rare, 313. 
335 Ibid. 
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distinctiveness. Brown, who references Andy Clark's book Being There, states that some 
of the most important aspects of human intelligence are not within the brain or body at all 
but in "external scaffolding," which is the emergence of the highest form of human mental 
processing. 336 Clark states, "We use intelligence to structure our environment so that we 
can succeed with less intelligence. Our brains make the world smart so that we can be dumb 
in peace! ... It is the human brain plus these chunks of external scaffolding that finally 
constitutes the smart, rational inference engine we call mind."337 
Donald tells us that the emergence of the human ability for symbolic computing 
was the great divide. It is not symbolic computing in itself that is important; it is the forward 
trajectory of expansion and becoming something essentially higher. It is a way for human 
beings to flourish in the world. Brown states that "some of the most important elements of 
human mental capacities arise from that which the long cultural history of the human race 
has built into our environments to augment our cognitive processes. "338 Our social 
embeddedness in a "social and cultural context serves not only to influence the self-
assembly and continual reorganization of our bodily neurocognitive systems, but it also 
offloads much of the cognitive work that allows us to act intelligently and creatively and 
to flourish as persons and as societies."339 It is interesting that Brown points out that we 
become intelligent "by learning to use ' tools' that we did not have to invent."340 It is by 
336 Brown, "Emergence of Human Distinctiveness," 120. 
337 Andy Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1997), 180. 
338 Brown, "Emergence of Human Distinctiveness," 121. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Ibid. 
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this that "we could also reasonably argue that human social intelligence---our deep 
sociality-is scaffolded by cultural systems within which we learn to negotiate the social 
world: families, nurseries, schools, universities, clubs, businesses, governments, etc."341 
Thus, "our process of self-assembly in becoming uniquely human is a matter ofleaming to 
marshal the benefits of interpersonal and social systems that we do not need to invent."342 
To summarize this section, the aspect of the human person is enriched when one's 
understanding is drawn from patterns across levels of emergence and across scientific 
theories. For example, Donald ' s work presented a trajectory of the gradual series of a 
hominid's evolutionary changes, from Miocene apes to modem humans. 343 He states that 
his model is the "outcome of a cross-disciplinary project" and was "constructed from 'big 
facts'; that is, the most enduring, and relatively stable, knowledge emanating from such 
fields as cognitive science, evolutionary biology, developmental psychology, comparative 
neuroanatomy, paleontology, archaeology, psycholinguistics, and anthropology."344 
341 Brown, "Emergence of Human Distinctiveness," 121. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Donald, "Definition of Human Nature," 198. 
344 Merlin Donald, "Mimesis Theory Re-Examined, Twenty Years after the Fact," in Evolution of 
Mind, Brain, and Culture, ed. Gary Hatfield and Holly Pittman (Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania Press, 
2013), 174. 
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PartC 
7. Conclusion: Definition and Clarifications 
It is difficult to define emergence with a degree of certainty. Goodenough and 
Deacon state that emergence not only surrounds us in the non-living world, but it is also 
the key dynamic ofliving organisms. This description reminds me of the description of the 
living 'force' in the Star Wars franchise. The definition I offer would place me in the same 
camp as Clayton and Gregersen. 
My working definition of emergence is as follows: emergence is a scientific 
perspective by which we integrate the evolutionary perspective to describe how something, 
due to an increase in complexity, can emerge from the lower to become something 
essentially higher, often in new ways that are unpredictable, irreducible, novel, and 
surprising. 
Two points of clarifications are necessary. These clarifications were raised by 
Clayton on the doubts one may have on emergence. First, it concerns the disparity between 
science and philosophy. Clayton writes that "philosophy requires theories that are unified, 
consistent, and as conceptually exact as possible, theories that can be applied without 
ambiguity across a wide variety of fields."345 Yet, "the theoretical contexts are so radically 
different for any two cases of emergent phenomena in the natural world," such as between 
"the emergence of the classical physical world from quantum mechanical states."346 
Clayton also points out that there is no such thing as "a science of emergence."347 However, 
345 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 45. 
346 Ibid. 
347 Ibid. 
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Clayton notes that "what the scientific theories describe are, at least in some cases, 
emergent phenomena. But this observation is meta-scientific or philosophical rather than 
directly scientific."348 
The example I presented was guided by my own philosophical enquiry and my 
study of the patterns across scientific theories. There are commonalities in the work of 
Donald and Fuster. Clayton points out that this method might not seem attractive to those 
who want a more rigorous theory. His point is that "emergence is disanalogous, since a 
theory in this field will not be successful unless it is derived from more than one scientific 
discipline."349 Since emergence is considered a perspective and not a theory of science, it 
is "an overarching concept that must pertain to theoretical structures and results in multiple 
fields. As a consequence, it cannot draw too heavily on the details of theories in any 
particular discipline. "350 
In the next chapter, I will argue that this scientific perspective of emergence is 
congruent with and can enrich Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence. 
348 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 45 . 
349 Ibid., 46. 
350 Ibid. 
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Chapter 3 
Active Self-Transcendence and the Scientific Perspective of Emergence 
I maintain m this thesis that the scientific perspective of emergence can add 
robustness to Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence. In this chapter, I will argue that 
both positions inherently share a common premise and that the characteristics that define 
emergence are also present in active self-transcendence in such ways that active self-
transcendence can incorporate the characteristics of emergence in its description of how 
matter can increase in complexity until it becomes something essentially higher. 
As was mentioned in the first chapter, Rahner has been part of the dialogue between 
theology and science even before the Second Vatican Council. He grappled with the 
scientific perspective of the universe, as evidenced in his writings. In "Natural Science and 
Reasonable Faith," he tries to "forge a link between theology and the basic concepts of an 
evolutionary 'world view"' and on "the question of the evolution ofliving beings and the 
idea of a universal evolutionary development of the cosmos."351 The notion of active self-
transcendence is integrated in the evolutionary view of the world. 
There are more similarities than dissimilarities between active self-transcendence 
and emergence. Davies invites his readers to move toward an emergentist worldview. He 
stated earlier that the universe started out in a simple, almost totally featureless state, but 
the complexity, diversity, and richness on all scales of size have emerged since the Big 
Bang in a long sequence of physical processes. 352 He writes that "scientists would like to 
351 Rahner, "Natural Science Reasonable Faith," 33. 
352 Davies, "Towards an Emergentist Worldview," 3. 
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understand the nature and origin of this complexity."353 I could add that the rest ofus would 
also like to understand, but I do not know if that is necessarily true. What is true is that the 
scientific perspective of emergence has enabled those who are interested in understanding 
to have some limited grasp of the complexity required to give rise to something that has 
emerged from an essentially lower level. Thus, while we say that the notion of active self-
transcendence was developed with an evolutionary view in mind, the same can be said of 
the "emergence theory [that] was formed in the safe context of the Darwinian revolution 
in science."354 
1. Putting It Together 
Rahner presents his view on how nature develops through his notion of active self-
transcendence. I refer to emergence as a scientific perspective in this thesis, and I think it 
is important to flesh out the difference between a perspective and a notion. Perspective is 
synonymous with viewpoint, standpoint, or outlook. Clayton believes that emergence is a 
philosophical position, and I agree with him. However, I prefer to use the term 'scientific 
perspective' within a specific philosophical position to describe the nature of things. 355 
Though emergence is sometimes described as "emergence theory," even in this thesis, it is 
not a specific theory of science like the theory of the Big Bang.356 As such, a scientific 
perspective seems to be a good description. 
353 Davies, "Towards an Emergentist Worldview," 3. 
354 Gregersen, "Emergence and Complexity," 768. 
355 My view is that the philosophical position of emergence lies in the characteristics which I have 
explored in the previous chapter. 
356 Clayton and Gregersen use the term 'emergence theory' in their work. 
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Notion is synonymous with idea, concept, and perception. Rahner speaks of the 
"unity of philosophy and theology" in his work, and this unity is essential for an 
understanding that embodies existence and the Christian life. 357 Like emergence, Rahner' s 
position is not a scientific theory. While examining theology from an evolutionary 
perspective, Rahner described a philosophical position that is identical to the philosophical 
position of emergence. What I mean by similar position is not to say that active self-
transcendence and emergence are identical but that they share similar orientations, such as 
of seeing the unity of all things and a recognition of a hierarchy between the higher and 
lower in terms of complexity. This is because both positions were developed with an 
evolutionary theory in mind. 
In the first chapter, I defined Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence in two 
parts. Active self-transcendence can be described as matter developing in a process of 
becoming whereby the higher levels are orientated in terms of an ever-increasing 
complexity with and through the lower levels of matter, giving rise to something 
substantially new, a leap into something essentially higher. This is made possible through 
the creative power of the absolute fullness of being that is so intrinsic to the finite existent 
that this finite existent is empowered to achieve a real and active self-transcendence. 358 I 
presented the definition of active self-transcendence in two parts because the first part 
clearly shows that Rahner has weaved an evolutionary perspective into his notion of active 
self-transcendence, while the second incorporates the element of faith and explains how 
there can be an increase in complexity resulting in the higher from the lower. 
357 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 10-11. 
358 Refer to page 31. 
82 
Earlier, I defined emergence as follows : Emergence is a scientific perspective by 
which we integrate the evolutionary perspective to describe how something, due to an 
increase in complexity, can emerge from the lower to become something essentially higher, 
often in new ways that are unpredictable, irreducible, novel, and surprising. 359 What I 
assert in this thesis is that emergence can best concretize the general principles and truth 
of Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence. Furthermore, the meanings and 
characteristics of emergence from a scientific perspective can also belong to the notion of 
active self-transcendence. This is especially true because they both share similar 
philosophical positions. 
An obvious question then is, what are the characteristics in Rahner' s notion of 
active self-transcendence? In the first chapter, I pointed out some of the key words that 
Rahner uses in Foundations to describe the notion of active self-transcendence. The key 
words can also be considered as part of the characteristics of active self-transcendence. 
They include "becoming" (as in "becoming something more"), "surpassing of self," 
"intrinsic increase of its own being," and "emptiness actively achieving its own 
fullness ."360 Rahner sees that a finite existence is empowered to achieve a real and active 
self-transcendence. This is possible because of the power of the absolute fullness of being 
that is intrinsic in the finite existence. What is important to note now is that the notion of 
self-transcendence "includes transcendence into something substantially new, a leap to 
something essentially higher. "36 1 The characteristics of active self-transcendence are 
359 Refer to page 82 . 
360 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 184. These concepts are similar to his essay 
"Christology within an Evolutionary View," Theological Investigations, 165-166. 
36 1 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 185. 
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similar to those of the characteristics of emergence, as I will argue below.362 But first, I will 
present an outline of my argument of how the scientific perspective of emergence can give 
robustness to Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence in table 7. 
Table 7: Outline of how emergence enriches active self-transcendence 
The scientific perspective of emergence The notion of active self-transcendence 
'Scientific perspective' within a specific 
philosophical position to describe the nature 
of things. 
(My working definition of emergence) 
Emergence is a scientific perspective 
by which we integrate the evolutionary 
perspective to describe how something, due 
to an increase in complexity, can emerge 
from the lower to become something 
essentially higher, often in new ways that 
are unpredictable, irreducible, novel, and 
surprising. (82) 
1.1. The Unity of All Things 
Monism, the idea that reality is 
ultimately composed of one basic kind 
of stuff. (85) 
1.2. Hierarchical Complexity: Higher and 
Lower. (87-90) 
1.3. No Monolithic Law (90) 
1 .4. Patterns Across Levels of Emergence 
(90-91) 
Notion is synonymous with idea, concept, 
and perception. 
(First part of my working definition) 
Active self-transcendence can be 
described as matter developing in a process 
of becoming whereby the higher levels are 
orientated in terms of an ever-increasing 
complexity with and through the lower levels 
of matter, giving rise to something 
substantially new, a leap into something 
essentially higher. (32) 
1.1. The Unity of All Things 
Monism, the idea that reality is ultimately 
composed of one basic kind of stuff. (85) 
1.2. Hierarchical Complexity: Higher and 
Lower. (87-90) 
Rahner uses the term 'higher' and 
'lower', including the term 'complexity' 
to characterize a process of active self-
transcendence. I also pointed out the 
inclusiveness ofRahner's notion where in 
Foundations, he described active self-
transcendence as the "transcendence into 
something substantially new, a leap to 
something essentially higher. "363 
1.3. No Monolithic Law (90) 
I .4. Patterns Across Levels of Emergence (90-
91) 
362 The characteristics of emergence can be found in pages 57-63. 
363 This was mentioned earlier in pages 20 and 32. 
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1.1. The Unity of All Things 
Monism, the idea that reality is ultimately composed of one basic kind of stuff, is 
important to the concept of emergence. This idea becomes relevant when the explanations 
of physics are not sufficient to explain what exists. There are a variety of ways in which 
this idea can be expressed. First, Clayton follows theologian and biochemist Arthur 
Peacocke and speaks on the idea of "emergentist monism." According to Clayton, "this 
process of hierarchical structuring [that] takes place over time: Darwinian evolution (and 
some forms of cosmological evolution) move from simple to the more complex."364 
Another is a means to address the concerns about Descartes's body-mind dualism. Clayton 
speaks of "emergentist dualism," which "asserts that really distinct levels occur within the 
one natural world and that objects on various levels can be ontologically primitive ( can be 
entities in their own right) rather than being understood merely as aggregates of lower-
level, foundational particles ( ontological atomism)."365 As noted earlier, Gregersen states 
that this description allows Clayton to have the "advantage of seeing the emergence of the 
human mind as continuous with other sorts of self-reproducing systems."366 Monism also 
agrees with Morowitz's twenty-eight distinct levels of emergence, which I described in the 
previous chapter. 367 However, I adhere to the idea of monism because emergence holds that 
there is a point from which everything began (i.e. , the Big Bang), and emergence accounts 
364 Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 60. 
365 Ibid., 63 . 
366 Gregersen, "Emergence and Complexity," 776. 
367 Refer to page 60. 
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for plurality in its hierarchy of systems. The essential idea is that the natural world is one 
and continuous, not disparate or dualistic. 
The position of monism can strengthen Rahner's position on the unity of all things, 
even if that unity originates from a divine being. Consider Rahner's concept of the intrinsic 
unity of spirit and matter in the human person. 368 It is a position similar to that of monism, 
which maintains that the universe is ultimately composed of one basic kind of stuff. When 
Clayton uses the term "emergentist pluralism," it allows him to synthesize the unity of the 
body with the emergence of the mind. Rahner, as I pointed out in chapter one, states that 
the "Christian professes in his faith that all things, heaven and earth, the realm of the 
material and of the spiritual, are the creation of one and the same God."369 If everything in 
the universe originates from God, then this means that all things in their variety "proceed 
from one cause."370 
According to Rahner, "It also means that this variety manifests an inner similarity 
and commonality, and that this variety or differentiation forms a unity in its origin, its self-
realization and its determination - that is, it forms a single world."371 This framework 
allows Rahner to claim that the human person is a part of the matter of creation that has 
become conscious. Spirit and matter are "mutually related and inseparable elements of the 
368 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 182. 
369 Ibid.' 181. 
370 Ibid. 
37 1 Ibid., 182. 
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single person," they are not "reducible to each other. "372 Rahner sees the unity of all things 
and notes that "it is the intrinsic nature of matter to develop towards spirit."373 
1.2. Hierarchical Complexity: Higher and Lower 
Hierarchical complexity is a point that was highlighted at the end of chapter one. It 
relates to the point Rahner makes about active self-transcendence, which is similar to the 
perspective of emergence, and it pertains to complexity. Rahner uses the terms 'higher' 
and 'lower' , including the term ' complexity', to characterize a process of active self-
transcendence. In the first chapter, we saw Rahner relating active self-transcendence to the 
development of biologically organized materiality, which is orientated in terms of an ever-
increasing complexity.374 I also pointed out the inclusiveness of Rahner' s notion where, in 
Foundations, he described active self-transcendence as the "transcendence into something 
substantially new, a leap to something essentially higher. "375 
This notion of a hierarchy of levels, systems, or complexity agrees with Rahner's 
position about a growing complexity of matter that transforms into something substantially 
new, that leaps to something essentially higher. This is also related to the perspective of 
strong or ontological emergence. Additionally, the idea is apparent in Gregersen's 
description of Emergence4, in Clayton ' s description of emergentist pluralism, and, of 
course, in the Hierarchical Complexity, which this thesis presents as a keystone in the 
perspective of emergence. 
372 Ibid., 184. 
373 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 184. 
374 Refer to page 32. 
375 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 185. 
87 
In table 8 below, Peacocke presents a classic perspective on the lower and the 
higher and on the hierarchy of disciplines (complexity). Vertically, Peacocke's series 
ranges from the physical to the cultural and includes the biological and the behavioral. 
Horizontally, Peacocke lists each emergent phenomenon at its respective level: everything 
in the physical world is constituted of matter-energy in space-time, the behavior of living 
organism is the focus of behavioral sciences, and so forth. 
Table 8: Hierarchies of Discipline 
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Peacocke states that level 4 is meant only to indicate some of the aspects of human culture, 
while in levels 1 to 3, he gives examples of the systems that correspond with their scientific 
disciplines. In level 2, he elaborates on the part-whole hierarchy of levels of organization 
within the nervous system.376 Theologian and physicist Robert Russell states that the 
vertical axis, which describes increasing complexity, makes two claims: "l) lower levels 
place constraints on upper levels (against ' two worlds' treatments that make them 
autonomous), but 2) upper levels are emergent and cannot be reduced entirely to lower 
levels (against 'epistemic reductionism' that evacuates upper levels of novel claims about 
the world)."377 For example, "physics places constraints on biology: no acceptable 
biological theory can contradict relativity or quantum mechanics."378 Russell adds that "at 
the same time no theory in biology can be reduced entirely to theories such as relativity or 
quantum mechanics in physics. Instead some of the processes, properties, and laws of the 
upper level are emergent in nature."379 
Russell emphasizes that the horizontal axis of the diagram is unique to Peacocke' s 
insight. Peacocke ranks the "natural phenomena in terms of their increasing size within the 
same epistemic level. Thus physical systems at the bottom of the diagram range from 
elementary particles to galaxies."380 Peacocke' s diagram is but one visual demonstration of 
the degree of emergence from the lower to the higher, and it reasserts the perspective of 
monism in emergence. Peacocke's diagram on the hierarchical complexity strengthens 
376 Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, 214. 
377 Russell, Cosmology, 7. 
378 Ibid. 
379 Ibid. 
380 Ibid. 
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Rahner's notion about the essential unity of all things and about the increase in complexity 
that results in something that is substantially new, something the leaps to a higher nature. 
1.3. No Monolithic Law 
If we accept both active self-transcendence and emergence as a philosophical 
position, then there should not be a monolithic law for both viewpoints. This will allow one 
to explore and discern patterns in the transitions between sciences. The hierarchical levels 
and Morowitz's work give us a sense of the broadness of the universe. Rahner's goal in his 
notion was to say how something can increase in complexity and how this increase gives 
rise to something new. This notion is not meant to be confined within a specific scientific 
theory. The essential point of Rahner's notion is to state that it is the creative dynamic 
power of the absolute being that makes active self-transcendence possible. To rephrase 
Clayton's statement on this earlier, that which can constitute the process of active self-
transcendence within the scientific perspective of emergence should be viewed as a term 
of family resemblance. 381 
1.4. Patterns across Levels of Emergence 
Understanding patterns across levels of emergence can help one to grasp how 
something can emerge, develop, or leap into something essentially higher. The patterns can 
also show more concretely the common traits that are to be found in the evolution of matter 
and of living and spiritual beings. In the second part of chapter two, I demonstrated how 
studying the patterns across levels of emergence can enrich what one can understand about 
what constitutes the human person. The relationship and interaction of the human being 
381 Refer to page 61. 
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with the forces outside of him or herself resulted in language, literacy, culture, diversity, 
and openness. This is close also to the classic example of Campbell's downward causation, 
as it manifests a characteristic of downward causation, namely, that we are shaped by our 
environrnent.382 Deacon offers more on this with his view on self-organization, auto-
catalyst, and autopoiesis. 383 
Rabner says that it will be ideal if we can show more concretely what common 
traits are to be found in the evolution of material, living, and spiritual beings towards a 
higher dimension oflife. 384 Integrating patterns across levels of emergence can achieve this. 
For me, understanding the patterns across levels of emergence include integrating different 
scientific theories. For example, one branch of science cannot do justice to the 
understanding and implications of Peacocke' s hierarchical complexity which we have seen 
earlier. It is only by understanding the patterns across levels of emergence with its different 
scientific theories that we can have an enriched understanding of the universe we live in 
and the amazing condition present from the beginning of time that gave rise to life and to 
the conscious human person. 
2. Clarifications 
I have endeavored to show that the perspective of emergence is broad. Can the same 
be said about the notion of active self-transcendence? I believe the answer is yes. Oliver 
Putz, a professor ofreligious studies, offered a critique on Rahner' s argument about matter 
382 Refer to pages 62-63 . 
383 Terrence Deacon, Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2013). 
384 Rahner, "Christology Within Evolutionary View," 168. 
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developing into life and, subsequently, into the human person.385 Response to this critique 
helps to clarify the broadness of Rahner's argument. 
Putz writes, "Rahner argues for a direction of evolution that leads inevitably to 
human beings, and he further insists that the natural sciences would have to agree."386 Putz 
seems to be over-reading Rahner. While Rahner does say that "there is no reason to deny 
that matter should have developed towards life and towards man," it does not seem that 
Rahner is 'insisting. ' 387 Furthermore, Putz states, "Rahner's line of reasoning resembles an 
ontological proof in that it simply presupposes that nature comes to itself in the human 
being, in which case Rahner is quite correct: the presence of man cannot be chance, but 
only fulfillment of the teleological process of evolution."388 He adds, "There is no reason 
to accept the assumption. "389 According to Putz, "what Rahner has demonstrated 
convincingly is that what is required for nature to come to itself is a conscious creature. As 
we have seen, there are more conscious species than man, and so his conclusion seems not 
to hold up."390 Rahner does not seem to be making an argument resembling an ontological 
proof like what we would see in the work of Thomas Aquinas, though it could be argued 
that his work follows the pattern of Aquinas. There is certainly a logical reasoning to how 
Rahner argues his point. Rahner was explaining how the human person arrives at 
385 Oliver Putz, "Evolutionary Biology in the Theology of Karl Rabner," Philosophy and Theology 
17, no. 1/2 (2005) , 100. The argument Putz refers to is found in Rabner, Foundations of Christian Faith , I 85-
186. 
386 Ibid. , I 00. 
387 Rabner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 186. 
388 Putz, "Evolutionary Biology," 101. 
389 Jbid. 
390 Ibid. 
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consc10usness through the process of active self-transcendence by integrating an 
evolutionary perspective. Nowhere in his writings does Rahner dismiss consciousness in 
other creatures. In fact , Rahner's essay in Theological Investigations proves that he does 
consider the evolution of all other creatures. He says that he was "presupposing the extreme 
in evolution as a given or as a hypothetical assumption of the natural scientist, and we are 
asking only whether something of this sort must be rejected by theology or not (The 
emergence of the human being will receive special consideration later)."39 1 And he asks, 
Is a continuous development of the cosmos from its simplest and most original 
components right up to its present differentiation and complexity, the realm of 
living being included, acceptable to Christian faith in such a way that it can leave 
this whole evolution to natural science as a thesis or hypothesis, and then, at most, 
afterwards include this evolution in a Christian conception of the world?392 
Rahner answers 'yes' to his own question and presents a framework of active self-
transcendence, and he specifically states that he is not yet considering the human person in 
that section of his argument. He writes, 
Our answer is yes .... Each in its own stage can become something else, can change 
and become "more" ("higher"), whereby this "more" can of course be quite 
different, cannot, however, be excluded in the development in favor of simply 
"being different," regardless of whether such a being different would really contain 
fewer metaphysical questions than a "being more."393 
Rahner does consider the evolutionary leap "of development to animal consciousness," and 
he thinks that it is a "sufficiently elevated organization of matter."394 Despite the sensitivity 
of the debate on the compatibility of the teachings of evolution and the Christian 
391 Rabner, "Natural Science Reasonable Faith," 38. 
392 Ibid. 
393 Ibid. 
394 Ibid., 40-41 
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conception of the world, Rahner still applies the notion of active self-transcendence to all 
creation, including animals. 395 
While I have argued that the scientific perspective of emergence can add robustness 
to Rahner's notion, it should be obvious that there is one major difference between the two: 
the scientific perspective of emergence stops at the level of science, while Rahner attributes 
active self-transcendence or emergence to the dynamic power of the absolute being we call 
God. It is the power of the absolute that causes matter to actively self-transcend. For 
Rahner, this is possible because God has been immanently present in creation. It is what 
he states that Christian theology formerly calls 'conservatio' and 'concursus '. 396 
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the scientific perspective of emergence can add 
robustness to Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence. I demonstrated how the 
meanings and characteristics of emergence can strengthen Rahner's notion. I also showed 
that both positions share an inherent commonality and that the characteristics that define 
emergence are also present in active self-transcendence. I also touched on monism, 
hierarchical complexity, no monolithic law, and patterns across levels of emergence. 
Additionally, in order to demonstrate the broadness of Rahner's argument, I responded to 
a critique put forth by Putz. 
The final point I wish to make is that Rahn er was limited by the science of his time. 
He was working with the discoveries of science that was about fifty years old. Although 
395 Rahner, ' 'Natural Science Reasonable Faith," 37-41. 
396 Refer to pages 23-24. 
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we now know far more about the human person, Rahner's notion of active self-
transcendence stills holds, and it helps us to understand divine action within an 
evolutionary perspective. Rahner's notion is still relevant and is made even richer and more 
robust by the scientific perspective of emergence. 
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Conclusion 
A Step Further: On Sacred Ground 
We have explored how the scientific perspective of emergence can enrich Rahner's 
notion of active self-transcendence. The question of what this means and its implication 
seems to be the next logical step. Other than contributing to the relationship between 
theology and science, this thesis can also relate to how we can respond to God and to the 
world we live in today. 
In the first chapter, I showed how Rahner states that the human person faced 
themselves as a question. In facing themselves as a question, human persons are already 
quodamodo omia (in a certain way everything). The Book of Exodus tells us that God's 
name is "YHWH," which means, "I-AM-WHO-AM" (Exodus 3:14). It tells us that God 
simply 'is'. I agree with Rahner that human persons face themselves as a question. The 
question "I AM?" is deeply felt in one's being. These questions which never cease are the 
grounds of one's transcendence into the horizon of mystery. The person who is faced with 
the question of "I AM?" reaches out to the absolute being who simply 'is'. There is an 
openness in one's orientation which Rahner calls the pre-apprehension (Vorgrif.f) of being. 
One stretches out beyond oneself into one's horizon, but the horizon recedes further and 
further the more answers one discovers. If this can be considered as a continual increase of 
one's being, then the process of becoming is still ongoing. In my view, Rahner integrated 
an evolutionary perspective into a dynamism that is still ongoing in creation. 
Part A of the first chapter explained what emergence entailed while part B showed 
an aspect of how we can conceive this on-going process of becoming. Part B demonstrated 
that integrating theories across various scientific disciplines can tell us how something, due 
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to an increase in complexity, can emerge from the lower to become something essentially 
higher, often in new ways that are unpredictable, irreducible, novel, and surprising. The 
starting point of emergence is similar to a point made by Rahner. The scientific perspective 
of emergence is fueled by human persons facing themselves as a question. In this respect, 
the reductionist perspective is just too poor an answer for the question of "I AM?" and why 
there is 'something' in the universe instead of 'nothing'. It is what Hawking and Mlodinow 
state in the first chapter of their book, "To understand the universe at the deepest level, we 
need to know not only how the universe behaves, but why. Why is there something rather 
than nothing? Why do we exist? Why this particular set of laws and not some other?"397 
What can both active self-transcendence and emergence mean for us as human 
persons? Clayton points out that the logical conclusion to the trajectory of emergence of 
the human person is freedom and self-transcendence. He states, "We have found that the 
pattern of emergence points toward continuously new forms of complexity and causality; 
it is the nature of the evolutionary process to be continually self-transcending toward ever 
new forms of novelty."398 He argues that the "more complex the life form, the more 
openness it reveals and the more it transcends its immediate environment."399 "Homo 
sapiens," Clayton claims, "with its ability to create inner models of imaginary worlds 
radically different from the actual one, is undeniably the most radically self-transcending 
species to date. "400 
397 Hawking and Mlodinow, The Grand Design, 10. 
398 Clayton, In Quest of Freedom, 141 . 
399 Ibid. 
4oo Ibid., 141-142. 
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There is then a dynamism or an internal movement that is happening within one's 
mental processes that affects one's being. It is not a stretch then to consider that having 
faith as a believer opens the horizons of one's life. For example, faith can contribute to the 
quality of one's marriage and family life. Imagine a faith that is related or integrated with 
a scientific perspective of emergence. Applying the eyes of faith as a believer of the 
absolute presence on the idea of 'becoming' and that the human person is forever in the 
process of self-expanding tells us that we are part of a divine creative movement even if 
we cannot fully grasp what that is. Borrowing a phrase by Rabner, there is a sense that we 
are grasped by the mystery of the divine. 
Rabner tells us that "from the outset God is lovingly seeking in freedom to bestow 
himself and, because he so wills in freedom, because he wills grace, he must create a 
'nature' to which he can impart himself as free love."40 1 Thus, "nature is, because grace 
has to be."402 In other words, we 'are' because grace has to 'be ' . The creative power of 
God is already intrinsic in creation, in all life, in culture, and in every human person. We 
are all made of the same stuff of creation and have become aware and achieved 
consciousness. Grace is something present in all creation and at the heart of all existence. 
All conscious creatures can now recognize and accept God's offer of love, but the 
difference is in our 'acceptance' and our 'belief. Rabner tells us that the purpose of 
creation is to be divinized, and Christ, who entered the evolutionary process, was the first 
to accept this offer of love.403 The way is now open to us. Freedom is in our decision on 
401 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 19, Theology of Worship, trans. Edward Quinn 
(London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1984), 144. 
402 Ibid., 144. 
403 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 192-195. 
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whether or not to participate as an autonomous and "responsible person(s) in relation to the 
environment. "404 
I can see how Rahner can claim that the basic and ultimate thrust of Christian life 
is not from the fact that being Christian is a special instance of humankind but that "a 
Christian is simply man as he is."405 Rahner tells us that "the real and total and 
comprehensive task of a Christian is to be a human being, a human being of course whose 
depth are divine."406 I cannot help but think that Rahner's evolutionary view of the world 
shaped his understanding and also gave some shape to his theology. From my perspective, 
there is some 'grounded-ness' to his writings that is intelligible and which resonates with 
the realities of life. 
One notable point in Rahner' s notion of active self-transcendence and the scientific 
perspective of emergence is that there is a sense of kinship that we all emerged from the 
same place, namely, God. This dimension can speak to how we can respond as responsible 
persons. Theologian Elizabeth A. Johnson expresses this idea when talking about "the 
community of creation" paradigm in her work Ask the Beasts: Darwin and the God of 
Love. 407 Her paradigm revisits and abandons the model of dominion found in the first 
chapter of the Book of Genesis. She writes, "In a felicitous development, biblical scholars 
in our day have discovered that the paradigm of dominion is not the only nor even the main 
2014). 
404 Gregersen, "Emergence and Complexity," 777. 
405 Rabner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 402. 
406 Ibid. , 402. 
407 Elizabeth A. Johnson, Ask the Beasts: Darwin and the God of Love {London: Bloomsbury, 
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view proposed by the Bible."408 She states that "more common is the paradigm of the 
community of creation, based on the understanding that humans and other living beings, 
for all their differences, form one community woven together by the common thread of 
having been created by God."409 The community model emphasizes "our theological 
human identity as created, our biological embeddedness in the natural world, and our 
reciprocal interdependence with other species and the life-giving systems that support us 
all."410 Johnson argues that our responsibility as human persons is "best understood as 
stewardship and responsible care," and this is "one among many important exchanges we 
have with the natural world."411 She tells us that "human responsibility is exercised within 
creation, in relation to other fellow creatures who are created as we are, and upon whom 
we depend for our own lives. As a role among creatures, it is shepherding for which we are 
ultimately responsible to God."412 
I started this project with a pastoral concern in mind, which is that our practice of 
faith can be intelligible with the realities of life, the processes of nature, and with the 
discoveries of science. However, working on this thesis has also given me a greater 
appreciation of the sacredness of all life and of the miracle that creates the condition for 
the emergence of human life, which calls for a response. In the encyclical Laudato Si ', the 
Pope tells us that our uniqueness demands that we take responsibility for our neighbor and 
for our common home. Besides helping to improve the quality of life for all humans, we 
408 Johnson, Ask the Beasts, 261. 
409 Ibid. 
41 0 Ibid. , 280. 
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412 Ibid. 
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must address the problems that threaten our common home such as air and water pollution, 
climate change, environmental degradation, and the loss of biodiversity. He writes, "If the 
simple fact of being human moves people to care for the environment of which they are a 
part, Christians in their tum 'realize that their responsibility within creation, and their duty 
towards nature and the Creator, are an essential part of their faith."'413 
Epilogue 
The universe is an open question, a place of deep mystery. There can only be 
questions because there is someone to ask; there can only be mystery because there is 
someone to ponder it. We human beings are knowers: we know that we know, we also 
know that we do not know, though some may argue that most people do not know that they 
do not know. When I read Rahner last year, he made a point that struck me to my core. Our 
questions drive us, open our horizons, and they are the ground from which we transcend 
into the mystery of God. This led me to examine Rahner's notion of active self-
transcendence within the scientific perspective of emergence. 
Active self-transcendence as I saw it is as follows: Active self-transcendence can 
be described as matter developing in a process of becoming whereby the higher levels are 
orientated in terms of an ever-increasing complexity with and through the lower levels of 
matter, giving rise to something substantially new, a leap into something essentially higher. 
This is made possible through the creative power of the absolute fullness of being that is 
413 Francis, Laudato Si', Chap. 1, no. 64. 
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so intrinsic to the finite existent that this finite existent is empowered to achieve a real and 
active self-transcendence. 414 
I was amazed at how close the discussion of emergence is to Rahner's notion. My 
own working definition of emergence is as follows: Emergence is a scientific perspective 
by which we integrate the evolutionary perspective to describe how something, due to an 
increase in complexity, can emerge from the lower to become something essentially higher, 
often in new ways that are unpredictable, irreducible, novel, and surprising. 415 
I hope that my thesis raises more questions than it answers. I intend to continue 
studying the openness of the human person. I want to know more about brain science that 
tries to explain this wide horizontal dimension and its implications for theology. There are 
also, for me, more practical questions, such as those about grace, sacraments, and about 
how God acts. In the meantime, Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence can fill one 
with hope and give one a positive outlook for the present and for the future. 
414 Refer to page 3 1. 
415 Refer to page 78 . 
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